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CASE COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-IN RE GRAND JURY MATTER, GRONOWICZ:
QUALIFIED NEWSPERSON'S PRIVILEGE DOES NOT EXTEND TO
AUTHORS
In In re GrandJury Matter, Gronowicz, 1 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit held that a grand jury could subpoena
an author's personal notes and records while investigating him for
mail and wire fraud. The court reasoned that because the investiga-
tion was proper and the material sought was relevant to the investi-
gation, the grand jury could issue the subpoena consistent with the
first amendment. The court did not consider a qualified privilege
to balance the author's first amendment rights with society's inter-
est in prosecuting crime. Other courts, however, have applied such
a privilege in different contexts. Ignoring this privilege could ar-
guably chill the free flow of information from writers.
This comment discusses the Gronowicz court's analysis of the
grand jury's power to subpoena an author's personal notes and
records. Part I sets forth the facts and holding of Gronowicz. Part II
then examines the qualified journalist's privilege and argues that
this privilege should apply to grand jury proceedings. Next, Part
III analyzes the first amendment implications of Gronowicz. Finally,
Part IV concludes that the court's failure to recognize a qualified
privilege may have an adverse effect on future publications.
I. In re Grand Jury Matter, Gronowicz
In his book, God's Broker, author Antoni Gronowicz intended to
portray "[t]he life of PopeJohn Paul II as told in his own words and
in the reminiscences of cardinals, bishops, and friends." 2 Gro-
nowicz informed his publishers and a film producer that he based
the text on personal interviews with the Pope and other Vatican
officials.3 After obtaining information which suggested that Gro-
nowicz had never interviewed the Pope, the publisher and movie
producer concluded that the book was a fraud insofar as it pur-
ported to recount interviews which never took place.4
The government initiated an investigation to determine
whether Gronowicz had defrauded the publisher and producer in
1 764 F.2d 983 (3d Cir. 1985).
2 Id. at 985.
3 Id.
4 Id.
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violation of the federal mail and wire fraud statutes. 5 In the pro-
ceeding, the grand jury issued a subpoena duces tecum 6 requiring
Gronowicz to produce all notes and records compiled in prepara-
tion of God's Broker. Gronowicz moved to quash the subpoena,
claiming that the documents were sought for an improper purpose
because the investigation itself was outside the authority of the
grand jury. 7 Gronowicz alleged that the first amendment prohib-
ited the investigation because it inquired into the truth of assertions
made by him in his book. Gronowicz also maintained that, as an
author, he was protected by a federal common law privilege from
producing materials related to the writing of his book.8 The United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania denied
Gronowicz's motion to quash. The court held that the grand jury
properly issued the subpoena because it sought information rele-
vant to the investigation. 9 Gronowicz appealed from the order of
the district court.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit af-
firmed, rejecting Gronowicz's argument that the investigation was
outside the authority of the grand jury. 10 Addressing the federal
common law privilege, the court stated that no case has recognized
a press privilege to be "absolutely free from inquiry into the legality
of the reporter's own activities, even those reflected in a publica-
tion."' ' The court noted that the press privilege is only a qualified
one; it is ordinarily invoked by reporters called to testify in pro-
ceedings directed against third parties.' 2
Once the court determined that the investigation was not
barred by the federal common law privilege, it considered the pro-
5 The relevant statutes are 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (1982).
6 A subpoena duces tecum is a process by which the court, at the instance of a party,
commands a witness who has in his possession or control some document or paper that is
pertinent to the issues of a pending controversy, to produce it at trial. BLACK'S LAw Dic-
TIONARY 1279 (5th ed. 1979). See FED. R. Civ. P. 45 and FED. R. CRIM. P. 17.
7 Gronowicz also objected (1) because the subpoena sought information that was
within the protection of the Pennsylvania Shield Law, 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 942 (Pur-
don 1982) (affords privilege to journalists not to disclose information obtained during
course of their newsgathering); (2) because it was burdensome, oppressive, and unreason-
able; and (3) because Gronowicz's health precluded his personal appearance. Gronowicz,
764 F.2d at 984-85. These objections were not considered on appeal.
8 Id. at 985-86.
9 The order was modified and defendant Gronowicz still refused to comply. The court
directed Gronowicz to show cause why he should not be held in civil contempt. He unsuc-
cessfully asserted the same objections, see note 7 supra, and the court ordered him to pay
$500 a day until he complied. Id. at 984.
10 Id. at 986.
11 Id. The court recognized that an author may be held accountable for culpable false-
hoods, both criminally and civilly. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964); New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
12 764 F.2d at 986.
[Vol. 61:245
CASE COMMENTS
priety of the subpoena duces tecum. The court stated that a valid
grand jury subpoena must fulfill the following requirements: (1) the
subpoenaed items must be relevant to the investigation; (2) the
items must be properly within the grand jury's jurisdiction; and
(3) they must not be sought primarily for another purpose.13 The
court reasoned that if the first amendment allowed the grand jury
to proceed with the investigation, then these three requirements
would be satisfied.14
In analyzing the first amendment question, the court analo-
gized mail and wire fraud with libel.' 5 In libel cases, courts rely on
scienter requirements to protect first amendment interests.' 6 The
Gronowicz court stated that the scienter requirement for fraud "is at
least as strict as that held to be the constitutional minimum for li-
bel." 17 The court concluded that because no significant differences
exist between libel and fraud, the scienter requirement for fraud
would adequately protect the first amendment rights of authors.' 8
Because the grand jury investigation was proper, and because no
constitutional problem existed, the majority opinion ruled that the
grand jury properly issued the subpoena duces tecum.19
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Higginbotham similarly recog-
nized the propriety of the grand jury's investigation into Gro-
13 Id. at 986 (citing In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Schofield, 507 F.2d 963, 966 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1015 (1975)). In Schofteld, the court reviewed these requirements
in a case where the defendant was held in civil contempt for refusing to comply with a grand
jury subpoena directing her to submit to fingerprints, photographs, and handwriting exem-
plars. The court held that although the district court could have required a further showing
on the government's part, the three-part test requirements were satisfied. 507 F.2d at 966-
68.
14 764 F.2d at 986.
15 Id. at 988.
16 Courts balance the first amendment with societal interests in protecting others from
the harm of defamation by demanding a specific scienter requirement. The scienter re-
quirements vary depending upon whether the plaintiff is a public or private figure. When
the plaintiff is a public figure, the scienter requirement is knowledge of falsity or reckless
disregard of the truth. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964). See
Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
17 764 F.2d at 988.
18 Id.
19 Two judges submitted concurring opinions. Each discussed the possible fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination. They concluded that Gronowicz possessed
a personal fifth amendment privilege to refuse compliance with the subpoena. Id. at 989-
91.
In the principal case, Gronowicz did not assert the fifth amendment privilege. Id. at
985. In failing to do so, he did not waive his right to assert it once the grand jury proceed-
ings recommence. While it is not in issue here, it appears likely that Gronowicz would
succeed if he asserted a fifth amendment privilege. According to United States v. Doe, 465
U.S. 605 (1984), compelling production of an individual's books and papers for use against
him in legal proceedings violates the fifth amendment. The act of producing subpoenaed
documents cannot be compelled without a statutory grant of use immunity pursuant to 18
U.S.C. §§ 6002-6003 (1982).
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nowicz's alleged violation of the mail and wire fraud statutes.20 The
dissent, however, differed on the question of how the grand jury
could proceed. Judge Higginbotham stated that a grand jury ought
to recognize a qualified privilege when it directs a subpoena at "the
author of a book who is the target of a grand jury investigation into
the truthfulness of his assertions of fact." 21 This qualified privilege
would permit access to unpublished information held by writers
where the movant shows that: (1) he or she has made an effort to
obtain the information from other sources; (2) that the only access
to the information is through the writer and his or her sources; and
(3) the information must be crucial to the claim.22
Judge Higginbotham found that the government had not made
a showing of need that could overcome Gronowicz's right to resist
disclosure of documents compiled in preparation of God's Broker.23
According to Judge Higginbotham, the "sweeping" subpoena re-
sembled a "fishing expedition" more than a search for "crucial"
20 764 F.2d at 994. Two other judges also dissented. Judge Hunter conceded that
while the three-part test utilized by the majority normally suffices, it was not adequate here
because the focus was on the truth of the book itself, not on the misrepresentations. Id. at
992.
Judge Hunter also asserted that the majority improperly relied on private suits to cir-
cumvent the first amendment concerns. See, e.g., Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979)
(holding that no first amendment privilege exists barring a defendant from inquiring into
the editorial process where the inquiry will produce evidence relevant to proving a critical
element of the plaintiff's cause of action). Judge Hunter stated that "the First Amendment
primarily protects citizens from government intrusion into their freedom of expression, and
not against private efforts to gain vindication by civil actions." 764 F.2d at 994 (emphasis in
original).
Judge Sloviter's dissenting opinion went a step further. She criticized the majority
opinion for freely analogizing criminal fraud with civil libel, asserting that the analogy over-
looked the role played by the government and its ability to control, and even manipulate,
the grand jury in a fraud action. Id. at 1001. She suggested that a balancing test was not
enough to temper this problem. Id. at 1002.
According to judge Sloviter, the absence of any precedent in this precise situation indi-
cates that the criminal process has never previously been used to investigate the truthful-
ness of a book or writing dealing with an important public issue. Id. The court's decision,
Judge Sloviter stated, is incompatible with the first amendment. Id. Ultimately, she sug-
gested that it would be best "to relegate one potentially fraudulent book to the remedy
provided by the civil law in order to insure that there is no inhibition in the future on
speech concerning public affairs." Id. Judge Sloviter expressed concern over potential
abuse of the Gronowicz decision by a prosecutor "who is imbued with a sense of zealous
righteousness." Id. at 1000.
21 Id. at 999.
22 Id. Judge Higginbotham cited United States v. Criden, 633 F.2d 346, 358-59 (3d Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1113 (1981), which held that a journalist could not refuse to
affirm or deny that she had conversed with a particular individual concerning matters ar-
guably relevant to the judicial inquiry when the individual had already testified.
While this privilege admittedly had never been applied in a situation precisely like Gro-
nowicz's, Judge Higginbotham argued that it should not matter that "appellant's medium
was a book, rather than a newspaper article," or that the person claiming it was the target of
the investigation. 764 F.2d at 999.
23 Id. at 1000.
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information. 24 It would require production of papers having only
attenuated relevance to any mail fraud. Moreover, the government
had not shown that it could not obtain the information it sought
from other sources. Judge Higginbotham therefore concluded that
the grand jury improperly issued the subpoena. 25
II. The Qualified Journalist's Privilege
Although the rights guaranteed by the first amendment are
highly respected by the courts, these rights are not absolute. First
amendment rights may be subordinated when they clash with other
important interests, such as society's interest in prosecuting crime
or a civil plantiff's need for information. To protect first amend-
ment rights in light of these conflicting interests, many courts have
recognized a qualified privilege for writers to protect their sources.
While few courts have applied the privilege in grand jury investiga-
tions, recognition of the privilege first arose in the grand jury
context.
A. Creating a Balancing Test
In Branzburg v. Hayes,26 the United States Supreme Court con-
sidered three cases in which a reporter claimed a privilege not to
reveal his sources before a grand jury. In each case, the reporter
based the privilege on the first amendment.27 The reporters ar-
24 Id. at 999-1000.
25 Id.
26 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
27 Id. at 679-80. In the first of these cases, reporter Paul Branzburg observed produc-
tion of hashish in Jefferson County, Kentucky, and published his observations in the Louis-
ville Courier-Journal. The Jefferson County grand jury subpoenaed Branzburg, but he
refused to identify the subjects of his article. Branzburg alternatively claimed a reporter's
privilege under Kentucky law, the first amendment of the United States Constitution, or the
Kentucky Constitution. All claims of privilege were rejected by the trial court and the Ken-
tucky court of appeals.
In the second case, In re Pappas, 358 Mass. 604, 266 N.E.2d 297 (1971), television
newsman-photographer Paul Pappas was allowed into Black Panther headquarters during a
civil disturbance on condition that he not disclose anything he heard or saw except for an
anticipated police raid. The police raid never materialized and two months later, Pappas
refused to reveal his observations to a grand jury, asserting a first amendment privilege to
protect his confidences. Both the trial court and the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu-
setts denied Pappas' motion to quash the grand jury subpoena.
The final case, United States v. Caldwell, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970), concerned a
reporter, Earl Caldwell, who was assigned to cover the Black Panthers for the New York
Times. A federal grand jury subpoenaed Caldwell to testify before it. The subpoena did
not specify the extent of Caldwell's testimony. Caldwell moved to quash the subpoena,
arguing that a grand jury appearance would destroy his working relationship with the
Panthers. The district court issued a protective order to allow Caldwell to withhold the
identity of his sources, but Caldwell nonetheless refused to appear. He was ordered jailed
for contempt, but the Ninth Circuit reversed the order. The Ninth Circuit recognized a
qualified reporter's privilege based on the first amendment. The court reasoned that re-
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gued that forcing a reporter to reveal his sources to the grand jury
would deter individuals from providing information to reporters in
the future and consequently, chill the free flow of information.2 8
The Court rejected this argument, and denied the first amend-
ment privilege in grand jury proceedings. 29 Justice White, writing
for a 5-4 majority, noted courts' almost uniform rejection of the
first amendment argument in a grand jury context.30 Justice White
attributed this position to the historical role of the grand jury and
the necessary breadth of its investigatory powers. 31 He concluded
that the governmental interest in law enforcement exceeded the
"consequential, but uncertain, burden on news gathering" result-
ing from requiring reporters to testify.3 2 Thus, the Court held that
all three reporters must testify before the grand jury.33
I Despite the holding of the majority opinion, Branzburg in fact
opened the door to a qualified reporter's privilege. 34 In his concur-
rence, Justice Powell suggested that newspersons possess a quali-
fied privilege in the grand jury context. Justice Powell stated that:
The asserted claim to privilege should be judged on its facts by
the striking of a proper balance between freedom of the press
and the obligation of all citizens to give relevant testimony with
respect to criminal conduct .... In short, the courts will be
available to newsmen under circumstances where legitimate
First Amendment interests require protection. 35
Justice Stewart's dissent provided the strongest argument in
favor of recognizing the privilege. 36 Justice Stewart, concerned
about the potential "chill" on the flow of information caused by
requiring testimony from newsmen, posited that the grand jury's
power is not absolute. He reasoned that the first amendment
quiring a reporter to reveal his sources may deter his informants and cause the reporter to
censor his work. 434 F.2d at 1087-90.
28 408 U.S. at 679-80.
29 Id. at 690.
30 Id. at 685-86.
31 Id. at 686-88.
32 Id. at 690-91.
33 Id. at 708-09.
34 The weight of academic commentary agrees with this interpretation of Branzburg.
See, e.g., Goodale, Branzburg v. Hayes and the Developing Qualified Privilege for Newsmen, 26
HASTINGs L.J. 709 (1975); Murasky, The Journalist's Privilege: Branzburg and its Aftermath, 52
TEX. L. REV. 829 (1974); The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 HARV. L. REV. 50, 137-48 (1972);
Comment, The Newsperson's Privilege in Grand Jury Proceedings: An Argument for Uniform Recogni-
tion and Application, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 413 (1984). But see Yarbrough, Press
Privilege Claims and Balancing Doctrine, 31 ALA. L. REV. 523 (1980) (reading Branzburg to reject
any reporter's privilege based on the first amendment).
35 408 U.S. 665, 710 (1972) (Powell,J., concurring).
36 Id. at 725 (Stewart, J., dissenting). justices Brennan and Marshall joined injustice
Stewart's opinion. justice Douglas filed a separate opinion, calling for an absolute privilege
to reporters protecting their sources. Id. at 711 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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should weigh as heavily as the fourth and fifth amendment privi-
leges already recognized in grand jury proceedings. 37 To protect
these important first amendment rights, Justice Stewart proposed a
balancing test. The test provides that to obtain confidential infor-
mation from a reporter during a grand jury proceeding, the govern-
ment must show that: (1) it has probable cause to believe that the
newsman has information clearly relevant to a specific probable vio-
lation of the law; (2) the government cannot obtain the information
through alternative means less destructive of first amendment
rights; and (3) the government possesses a compelling and overrid-
ing interest in the information. 38
Lower courts have used Justice Stewart's test to fashion quali-
fied reporter's privileges for their jurisdictions. 39 Interestingly, the
privilege has been extrapolated to various civil and criminal pro-
ceedings, but rarely recognized in grand jury investigations. 40
B. Subsequent Application of the Balancing Test
Most federal and state courts have recognized a qualified re-
porter's privilege in civil cases and in criminal proceedings other
than grand jury investigations.4 1 Usually a reporter or journalist
37 Id. at 737 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
38 i at 743.
39 See notes 41-57 infra and accompanying text.
40 See note 66 infra and accompanying text.
41 The First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and District of Colum-
bia Circuits have recognized the journalist's qualified privilege. The Sixth and Seventh
Circuits have recognized the privilege at the district court level. See, e.g., Zerilli v. Smith,
656 F.2d 705 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (Privacy Act suit); United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d
139 (3d Cir. 1980) (criminal proceeding), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1126 (1981); Miller v. Trans-
american Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1980) (libel action), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041
(1981); Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583 (1st Cir. 1980) (libel
action); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433 (10th Cir. 1977) (civil rights action);
United States v. Steelhammer, 539 F.2d 373 (4th Cir. 1976) (civil contempt action), aff'd en
banc, 561 F.2d 539 (1977); United States v. Orsini, 424 F. Supp. 229 (E.D.N.Y.) (criminal
proceeding), aff'd mem., 559 F.2d 1206 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 997 (1977); Farr
v. Pitchess, 522 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1975) (criminal proceeding), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912
(1976); Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631 (D.C. Cir.) (libel action), cert. dismissed, 417 U.S. 938
(1974); Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986 (8th Cir. 1972) (libel action), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1125 (1973); Baker v. F & F Inv., 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972) (civil rights action), cert.
denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973).
State courts have also recognized the privilege. See, e.g., State v. St. Peter, 132 Vt. 266,
315 A.2d 254 (1974) (criminal proceeding); Brown v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 755, 204
S.E.2d 429 (criminal case), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 966 (1974).
Courts have based the privilege on the first amendment. The privilege promotes the
free flow of information, freedom of ideas, and unfettered discussion of controversial top-
ics. See United States v. Burke, 700 F.2d 70, 77 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 816 (1983);
United States v. Criden, 633 F.2d 346, 355 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1113 (1981);
United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139, 147 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1126
(1981); Bursey v. United States, 466 F.2d 1059, 1084 (9th Cir. 1972). Forcing journalists
and reporters to reveal sources and disclose information will "chill" the flow of informa-
tion. See notes 72-79 infra and accompanying text.
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who has authored a publication pertinent to an ongoing civil or
criminal proceeding asserts the privilege.42 In a typical criminal
case, the defendant seeks the journalist's information to exculpate
himself.43 In civil cases, the plaintiff ordinarily wants the informa-
tion to prove part of his case or to lead to probative information. 44
Although the person asserting the privilege is usually a jour-
nalist, newspaper companies, 45 television networks, 46 and authors
like Gronowicz 4 7 have all asserted the privilege. The privilege has
also been invoked to protect sources, 48 documents, 49 work notes,50
42 See, e.g., United States v. Burke, 700 F.2d 70 (2d Cir.) (journalist), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 816 (1983); Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (journalist); United States v.
Criden, 633 F.2d 346 (3d Cir. 1980) (journalist), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1113 (1981); Miller v.
Transamerican Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1980) (journalist), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
1041 (1981); United States v. Steelhammer, 539 F.2d 433 (4th Cir. 1976) (reporters), aff'd
en banc, 561 F.2d 539 (1977); United States v. Orsini, 424 F. Supp. 229 (E.D.N.Y.) (news-
man), affd mem., 559 F.2d 1206 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 997 (1977); Farr v.
Pitchess, 522 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1975) (reporter), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976); Carey v.
Hume, 492 F.2d 631 (D.C. Cir.) (column writer), cert. dismissed, 417 U.S. 938 (1974); Baker
v. F & F Inv., 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972) (journalist), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973);
Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986 (8th Cir. 1972) (reporter), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125
(1973); Bursey v. United States, 466 F.2d 1059 (9th Cir. 1972) (journalists).
43 See, e.g., United States v. Burke, 700 F.2d 70 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 816
(1983); United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1126 (1981); United States v. Criden, 633 F.2d 346 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1113 (198 1); United States v. Orsini, 424 F. Supp. 229 (E.D.N.Y.), afd mem., 539 F.2d 1206
(2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 997 (1977); Farr v. Pitchess, 522 F.2d 464 (9th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976); United States v. Hubbard, 493 F. Supp. 202 (D.D.C.
1979).
44 Most often, courts uphold the journalist's privilege to refuse to testify or deliver
documents or other information in civil cases. See, e.g., Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705 (D.C.
Cir. 1981) (Privacy Act suit against the federal government); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee
Corp., 563 F.2d 433 (10th Cir. 1977) (civil rights action against corporation involved in
death of Karen Silkwood); United States v. Steelhammer, 539 F.2d 373 (4th Cir. 1976) (civil
contempt trial involving a wildcat strike), aff'd en banc, 561 F.2d 539 (1977); Baker v. F & F
Inv., 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972) (civil rights action), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973).
A journalist often invokes the journalist's privilege in libel cases where the plaintiff
seeks the journalist's information to show that the published material was false, or to show
the requisite state of mind in publishing the information. See, e.g., Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v.
Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583 (1st Cir. 1980); Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc.,
621 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041 (1981); Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d
631 (D.C. Cir.), cert. dismissed, 417 U.S. 938 (1974); Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986
(8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973).
45 See, e.g., Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583 (1st Cir.
1980) (newspaper company).
46 See, e.g., United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1980) (television net-
work), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1126 (1981).
47 See, e.g., United States v. Hubbard, 493 F. Supp. 202 (D.D.C. 1979) (the fact that
reporter was subpoenaed regarding a book he was writing for his own personal gain is
irrelevant because the reporter's privilege must encompass all newsgathering efforts).
The person asserting the privilege need not be a full-time professional in the news
industry. See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433 (10th Cir. 1977) (reporter work-
ing on a documentary film who was not a regular salaried newspaper reporter could invoke
the privilege).
48 See, e.g., Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Miller v. Transamerican
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and other confidential information involved in assembling the pub-
lished piece. 51 This diverse application of the privilege coincides
with the underlying theory of the privilege; that is, the policy of free
flow of information supports the protection of any confidential in-
formation associated with speech.52
The privilege is qualified, however, and the moving party's in-
terest in the information may be so strong as to overcome it.
Courts have used a variety of tests to balance the competing inter-
ests of the journalist and the party seeking the information. The
tests have generally been patterned after Justice Stewart's test in
Branzburg. Courts most often uphold the privilege in civil cases,53
even when the publisher is the defendant in a libel case. 54 In a libel
case, courts balance the journalist's first amendment privilege
against the plaintiff's need for the information.
More difficult, however, are criminal proceedings where the
defendant seeks exculpating information.5 5 Unlike the civil situa-
tion, courts must balance the first amendment right of the journalist
against the sixth amendment right of the defendant to confront wit-
nesses against him.5 6 If the defendant shows that the information is
highly relevant to the trial, that he cannot obtain the information
from other sources, and that his interest in the information is com-
pelling, courts usually will find that his interest outweighs the
Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041 (1981); Bruno & Still-
man, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583 (1st Cir. 1980); Farr v. Pitchess, 522 F.2d
464 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976); Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. dismissed, 417 U.S. 938 (1974); Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986 (8th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973); Bursey v. United States, 466 F.2d 1059 (9th Cir.
1972).
49 See, e.g., United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1126 (1981); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433 (10th Cir. 1977).
50 See, e.g., United States v. Burke, 700 F.2d 70 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 816
(1983); United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1126 (1981); United States v. Hubbard, 493 F. Supp. 202 (D.D.C. 1979).
51 United States v. Steelhammer, 539 F.2d 373 (4th Cir. 1976), aff'd en banc, 561 F.2d
539 (1977); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433 (10th Cir. 1977). See also United
States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139, 147 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1126 (1981).
In Cuthbertson, the court reasoned that thejournalist's privilege is not limited to protection
of confidential sources. Id. at 147. The court observed that compelled production of a
reporter's resource materials can constitute a significant intrusion into the newsgathering
and editorial processes, substantially undercutting the public policy favoring the free flow
of information. Id.
52 See note 41 supra.
53 See note 44 supra.
54 Id.
55 See note 43 supra.
56 U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI. The sixth amendment in part provides: "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial
jury. . . to be confronted with witnesses against him; [and] to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor .
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privilege.57
C. The Privilege and Grand Jury Proceedings
In Bursey v. United States,58 the Ninth Circuit recognized the
journalist's privilege in the context of a grand jury investigation.
The Black Panther newspaper had published a speech by the Black
Panther's Chief of Staff in which he stated "we will kill Richard
Nixon."5 9 Two journalists from the newspaper refused to answer
questions put to them by a federal grand jury investigating a plot to
kill the President. 60 The court upheld the journalists' right to re-
fuse to answer the questions. 61 The court reasoned that speech,
press, and associational relationships are presumptively covered by
the first amendment even in a grand jury proceeding. Moreover,
the court stated that the burden rests on the government to estab-
lish that the first amendment does not apply to the particular in-
stance. 62 To overcome the privilege, the court ruled that the
government must show: (1) that the government's interest in the
subject matter is immediate, substantial, and subordinating; (2) that
a substantial connection exists between the information sought and
the overriding governmental interest; and (3) that the means of ob-
taining the information is no more drastic than necessary.63 The'
court found that the government failed to meet this burden. 64
Although the government asked for a rehearing based on the
Branzburg decision, the court refused.65
Since Bursey, no court has upheld the privilege in a grand jury
proceeding.66 Some courts, however, have indicated in dicta that
57 See, e.g., United States v. Criden, 633 F.2d 346, 358-59 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1113 (1981); United States v. Hubbard, 493 F. Supp. 202 (D.D.C. 1979).
58 466 F.2d 1059 (9th Cir. 1972).
59 Id. at 1065-66.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 1081-88.
62 Id. at 1082. The court stated that:
No governmental door can be closed against the [First] Amendment. No govern-
mental activity is immune from its force. That the setting for the competition be-
tween rights secured by the First Amendment and antagonistic governmental
interests is a grand jury proceeding is simply one of the factors that must be taken
into account in striking the appropriate constitutional balance.
Id.
63 Id. at 1083.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 1090-91.
66 Courts have relied on Branzburg's majority opinion in denying the privilege in grand
jury proceedings. See, e.g., Lewis v. United States, 517 F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1975) (radio sta-
tion manager did not have first amendment privilege to refuse to comply with federal grand
jury subpoena for a communique received from group claiming responsibility for a bomb-
ing because manager did not show that the investigation was conducted in bad faith);
Tofani v. State, 229 Md. 165, 465 A.2d 413 (1983) (newspaper reporter does not have first
amendment privilege to refuse to testify before grand jury where reporter had already pub-
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the privilege should apply in grand jury investigations.67 Although
a grand jury proceeding is private, the journalist must still provide
the confidential information he seeks to protect to the government.
Therefore, the potential chilling effect on the flow of information,
the concern which supports the privilege in other types of proceed-
ings, equally applies.
Other constitutional rights restrict grand jury investigations. A
grand jury may not violate a defendant's fifth amendment right
against self-incrimination or his fourth amendment right against
unreasonable searches and seizures. 68 Among constitutional rights,
the rights of freedom of speech and freedom of the press are para-
mount.69 Although criminals should not be permitted to "hide"
behind the first amendment, a qualified privilege would balance the
journalist's interest in keeping his information confidential against
the government's interest in investigating crime. In Branzburg, the
Court noted that the government's interest in prosecuting crime is
substantial;70 yet, so is our national policy of unrestricted flow of
ideas. Courts consider the journalist's first amendment rights even
when the opposing interest rests on constitutional grounds, as
when a criminal defendant needs exculpating information. 7' It
seems anomalous to refuse to provide a similar protective proce-
dure in grand jury proceedings.
III. Impact of Gronowicz
Gronowicz presents the first case in which a grand jury has com-
pelled an author, as the subject of an investigation, to submit his
personal notes and records used in preparing a publication. Be-
cause Gronowicz initially appears to limit the qualified reporter's
privilege and to expand the grand jury's investigative powers only
licly revealed names of her sources); Andrews v. Andreoli, 92 Misc. 2d 410, 400 N.Y.S.2d
442 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977) (a journalist has no first amendment privilege to refuse to testify
before a grand jury unless he can show the investigation is not in good faith or that the
subpoena constituted harassment).
67 See United States v. Burke, 700 F.2d 70, 77 (2d Cir.) (court indicated that reporters
have a qualified first amendment privilege even in grand jury proceedings), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 816 (1983); Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 711 & n.41 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (qualified first
amendment privilege would be available in some instances in grand jury proceedings);
Baker v. F & F Inv., 470 F.2d 778, 784-85 (2d Cir. 1972) (court interpreted Branzburg as
recognizing the need to balance first amendment values even where a reporter is asked to
testify before a grand jury), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973).
68 See, e.g., Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920) (4th
amend.); United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181 (1977) (5th amend.); Counselman v.
Hitchcock, 42 U.S. 547 (1892) (5th amend.). See also cases cited in Branzburg, 408 U.S. at
737, nn. 21-22 (Stewart, J., dissenting). See generally 38 AM JUR 2d Grand Juries §§ 8, 38
(1968).
69 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 734 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
70 See note 32 supra and accompanying text.
71 See notes 55-57 supra and accompanying text.
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marginally, other courts are likely to follow the majority's reason-
ing. The decision, however, overlooks the possibility that authors,
faced with the grand jury's power to obtain their personal notes and
records, may be reluctant to write, thus restricting the free flow of
ideas and information.
The first amendment concern created by the Gronowicz court
stems from the chilling effect this decision might have on future
publications. As the Supreme Court stated in Time, Inc. v. Hill, 7 2 the
guarantees of the first amendment "are not for the benefit of the
press so much as for the benefit of all of us. A broadly defined
freedom of the press assumes the maintenance of our political sys-
tem and an open society." 73 Restrictions on authors of non-fiction
works of public interest damage the public as much as restrictions
on the press.74
The majority opinion in Gronowicz relied upon the scienter re-
quirement 75 of the mail and wire fraud statutes76 to negate this
chilling effect. 77 The scienter requirement, however, is part of the
government's case at trial and provides little procedural protection
to the target of a grand jury investigation. The three-part test 78
articulated by the majority opinion merely requires the government
to show the relevance of the sought-after documents to the investi-
gation. 79 In effect, the majority opinion failed to adequately con-
sider Gronowicz's actual first amendment concern - the chilling
effect to authors when a grand jury may lawfully subpoena the au-
thor's personal notes and records when he or she is the subject of
an investigation.
On the other hand, the government maintains a strong interest
in law enforcement. Writers should not be given a license to com-
mit crimes by "hiding" behind the first amendment. To ensure a
proper balance between competing interests in cases involving first
amendment rights in the grand jury context, courts should uni-
72 385 U.S. 374, 389 (1967).
73 Id. at 389.
74 See generally Blasi, The Newsman's Privilege: An Empirical Study, 70 MICH. L. REv. 229
(1971); Comment, The Newsman's Privilege: Government Investigations, Criminal Prosecutions and
Private Litigation, 58 CALIF. L. REV. 1198 (1970) (noting that the adverse impact of the sub-
poena threat has been primarily in "poisoning the atmosphere," making insightful, inter-
pretive reporting more difficult).
75 See note 16 supra.
76 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (1982).
77 This chilling effect could potentially have far-reaching ramifications. Knowing that
he could be compelled to produce, through a subpoena duces tecum, notes and papers
relevant to the writing of his book, an author may not even consider transmitting his
thoughts into print.
78 See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
79 764 F.2d at 986.
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formly apply the qualified privilege as stated by Justice Stewart in
Branzburg.
IV. Conclusion
Courts have applied a qualified privilege in various criminal
and civil proceedings to protect the first amendment interests of a
writer. Few courts have recognized this privilege in grand jury in-
vestigations. Nevertheless, the threat of a grand jury investigation
as well as the threat of a civil or criminal trial can adversly affect
free speech. Therefore, the privilege should apply to grand jury
investigations.
The Gronowicz court sets a dangerous precedent by not recog-
nizing the qualified privilege. If subsequent courts follow suit, au-
thors may be reluctant to write, thus chilling the free flow of
information.
Lee L. Cameron, Jr.
Patrick E. Corbett
Elizabeth D. De Armond
Todd A. Gale
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CRIMINAL LAW-UNITED STATES V. BELL: REJECTING GUILT BY
ASSOCIATION IN SEARCH AND SEIZURE CASES
Guilt by association is an unreasonable basis for an intrusive
personal search. Yet, on this basis, several United States Courts of
Appeals have established an "automatic companion" rule.' Essen-
tially, this rule enables a law enforcement officer, pursuant to the
arrest of one individual, to conduct a pat-down search of an arres-
tee's companions to ensure that they are unarmed.2 The automatic
companion rule derives from the principle that an officer may stop
and frisk an individual when he can point to specific attributable
facts which justify that intrusion.3 This rule penalizes an individual
for being with the wrong person at the wrong time. In a recent
Sixth Circuit case, United States v. Bell,4 the court refused to adopt
the automatic companion rule. In Bell, the court held that the de-
fendant, as the companion of an arrested felon, was not automati-
cally subject to a pat-down search. The court held, however, that
based on traditional fourth amendment analysis, the search was
reasonable. 5
This comment analyzes the holding and reasoning of United
States v. Bell and discusses the validity of the automatic companion
rule as set forth by the Fourth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits.6 Part I
examines the development of the rule. Part II states the facts of Bell
and analyzes the court's justifications for rejecting the automatic
companion rule. Part III concludes that the automatic companion
rule would erode the individualized protections afforded by the
fourth amendment.
I. Development of the Automatic Companion Rule
The fourth amendment of the United States Constitution pro-
hibits unreasonable searches and seizures of individuals. 7 Accord-
I See notes 18-32, 36-38 infra and accompanying text.
2 United States v. Bell, 762 F.2d 495, 498 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 155 (1985)
(citing United States v. Berryhill, 445 F.2d 1189, 1193 (9th Cir. 1971)).
3 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). See notes 15-17 infra and accompanying text.
4 762 F.2d 495 (6th Cir.), cert denied, 106 S. Ct. 155 (1985). See notes 39-42 infra and
accompanying text.
5 Id. at 502.
6 See notes 18-32, 36-38 infra and accompanying text.
7 The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. See Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891)
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ingly, the United States Supreme Court has developed the
exclusionary rule,8 which suppresses evidence seized in violation of
the reasonableness requirement of the fourth amendment. The
Supreme Court in United States v. Di Re,9 a 1948 case, determined
that the automatic search of a person found in a car with validly
arrested suspects is unreasonable under the fourth amendment. In
Di Re, police searched defendant Michael Di Re, who was a passen-
ger in a car with a government informant and a man suspected of
selling counterfeit gasoline ration coupons. Police discovered such
coupons on Di Re. At trial, Di Re was convicted of knowingly pos-
sessing counterfeit gasoline ration coupons. The appellate court
reversed the conviction, holding that the evidence was the fruit of
an illegal search and therefore was not admissible. The Supreme
Court affirmed the reversal. 10
The Supreme Court rejected the Government's argument that
the search of Di Re was justified as incident to a legal search of the
car in which Di Re was a passenger. Because the Court found that
the police did not search the automobile, the search of Di Re could
not be incident to it." Moreover, even if the police legitimately
searched the car, it would not necessarily have conferred an inci-
dental right on the officers to search Di Re: "We are not convinced
that a person, by mere presence in a suspected car, loses immuni-
ties from search of his person to which he would otherwise be
entitled."12
The Court also rejected the Government's alternative argu-
ment that the police searched Di Re incident to his lawful arrest.
("No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the
right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all
restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.").
8 The exclusionary rule was first applied to federal criminal trials in Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). The United States Supreme Court extended the rule to state
criminal proceedings in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
9 332 U.S. 581 (1948). In Di Re, an informant, Reed, had told the officer that he was to
purchase counterfeit ration coupons from an individual named Buttita. Acting on this in-
formation, the investigator and a police detective trailed Buttita's car. Once Buttita parked
the car, the officer approached the car and found Buttita in the driver's seat, the informant
Reed as the only passenger in the back seat, and Michael Di Re, an unidentified passenger,
in the front seat. Reed identified Buttita as the only man who had given him the counterfeit
coupons which Reed held. The officer nevertheless frisked all three men, and took them to
the police station. When Di Re emptied his pockets as instructed, he produced several
counterfeit ration coupons. After booking and a thorough search, the police discovered
one hundred counterfeit coupons on Di Re. The coupons were introduced as evidence
over the defendant's objection, and the district court convicted Di Re. Id. at 583.
10 Id.
I1 Id. at 586.
12 Id. at 587. The Court in Di Re held that an individual in an automobile could not be
subject to a search without a warrant based on the automobile exception because an indi-
vidual has his own expectations of privacy. Id. at 587. See also Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132 (1925) (automobile exception).
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The Court found that Di Re's presence in the automobile not only
failed to create an inference of participation in the transaction be-
tween the other two occupants of the car, but also failed "to sup-
port the inference of any felony at all."' 3 Di Re's presence in the
car did not, by itself, support an inference of criminal behavior.
The Court held that the search of Di Re and seizure of the coupons
found in the search were illegal because they were based solely on
Di Re's presence in the car with a man suspected of selling counter-
feit coupons.' 4 Thus, the Supreme Court rejected the arguments
that searches of automobile companions are valid based on either
the automobile exception or the search incident to arrest exception
to the warrant requirement.
Some courts construed the Supreme Court's decision in Terry
v. Ohio'5 as supporting an automatic companion rule. The Terry ex-
ception to the warrant requirement allows the officer to conduct a
warrantless search for weapons in the course of an investigation of
suspicious or criminal behavior. 16 The Court justified such a lim-
ited pat-down search by weighing the public interest in law enforce-
13 332 U.S. at 593. The Court continued by stating that:
The argument that one who "accompanies a criminal to a crime rendezvous" can-
not be assumed to be a bystander.., is far-fetched when the meeting is not secre-
tive or in a suspicious hide-out but in broad daylight, in plain sight of passers-by,
in a public street of a large city .... Presumptions of guilt are not lightly to be
indulged from mere meetings.
Id.
14 Id. at 587, 593.
15 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Officer McFadden, patrolling an area in downtown Cleveland,
observed Terry and a companion loitering on the street, seemingly "casing" a store. The
two men joined a third man with whom they had conferred earlier. The officer believed
that perhaps the men were planning to rob the store, so he approached them and asked for
identification. When the men only mumbled a response, the officer frisked petitioner Terry
and felt a pistol in the pocket of his overcoat. He removed the overcoat completely and
confiscated a .38-caliber revolver. At trial Terry was convicted of carrying a concealed
weapon. The Supreme Court held that the officer did not act unreasonably in conducting a
limited pat-down search for weapons. Id. at 5-7, 30-31. See note 49 infra and accompanying
text.
16 The Court stated that:
When an officer is justified in believing that the individual whose suspicious behav-
ior he is investigating at close range is armed and presently dangerous to the of-
ficer or to others, it would appear to be clearly unreasonable to deny the officer the
power to take necessary measures to determine whether the person is in fact carry-
ing a weapon and to neutralize the threat of physical harm.
392 U.S. at 24. In Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968), a companion case to Terny, the
Court elaborated on this rule:
Before [a police officer] places a hand on the person of a citizen in search of any-
thing, he must have constitutionally adequate, reasonable grounds for doing so.
In the case of the self-protective search for weapons, he must be able to point to
particular facts from which he reasonably inferred that the individual was armed
and dangerous.
Id. at 64.
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ment against the intrusion into the privacy interests of the
individual.17
Despite the Supreme Court's straightforward rejection of auto-
matic searches of an arrestee's companion in Di Re, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit seized upon language
carefully chosen from Terry v. Ohio to justify the police search of a
companion. In United States v. Benryhill,'8 postal inspectors had ob-
tained a warrant for the arrest of defendant Raymond J. Berryhill
because he allegedly stole checks. Police officers, aware of this war-
rant, and aware that the defendant usually carried a weapon, lo-
cated the defendant and his wife in an automobile. The officers
stopped the car and arrested the defendant at gunpoint.
One officer noticed several envelopes in a paper bag at the top
of Mrs. Berryhill's purse. Although the officer did not have a war-
rant for Mrs. Berryhill, the officer searched the handbag and discov-
ered the evidence used to indict the defendant. The officer grew
suspicious and searched Mrs. Berryhill's purse after he saw the en-
velopes at the top of the bag. The court, however, avoided the ar-
gument that the envelopes led the officer to search the bag by
referring to the handbag as a reasonable depository for the weapon
Mr. Berryhill may have had in his possession.1 9 Defendant Berry-
hill unsuccessfully objected to the search of his wife's purse. The
court held that the search met the Terry standards which justify a
frisk20 because it was a limited search of an occupant of the arres-
tee's vehicle for weapons. 21
The Ninth Circuit in Berryhill rightly noted Di Re's relevance:
"[T]he lawful arrest of Berryhill cannot legalize a personal search
of a companion for evidence against her simply because she was
there." 22 The court, however, also cited Terry v. Ohio: "We think
that Terry recognizes and common sense dictates that the legality of
such a limited intrusion into a citizen's personal privacy extends to
a criminal's companions at the time of arrest." 23 The Berryhill court
extended Terry beyond its narrow confines: "All companions of the
arrestee within the immediate vicinity, capable of accomplishing a
17 Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 (citing Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-35, 536-
37 (1967)). In Terry, the Court described this public interest as the government interest in
"effective crime prevention and detection." 392 U.S. at 22. In Bell, the court stated that the
"reasonableness of a given search or seizure depends upon 'a balance between the public
interest and the individual's right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by
law officers.'" 762 F.2d at 499 (citing United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878
(1975)).
18 445 F.2d 1189 (9th Cir. 1971).
19 Id. at 1193.
20 Id. See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
21 445 F.2d at 1192.
22 Id. at 1193 (citing Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1948)).
23 445 F.2d at 1193.
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harmful assault on the officer, are constitutionally subject to the
cursory 'pat-down' reasonably necessary to give the assurance that
they are unarmed." 24 Thus, the Ninth Circuit's extension of Teny
ignored the principle set forth by the Supreme Court in Di Re that
the automatic search of a companion in a car is unlawful.25
Other United States Courts of Appeals have adopted the Berry-
hill court's extension of Terry to justify companion searches. The
Fourth Circuit, in United States v. Poms,26 referred to both Terry and
Benyhill in upholding the search of Alan Poms' shoulder bag. Poms
was a companion of Gabriel Brobow, for whose apartment the po-
lice had obtained a search warrant.
In Poms, both Brobow and defendant Poms were suspected of
narcotics trafficking. According to an informant, Poms lived in
Brobow's apartment. This same informant indicated that Poms
usually carried a brown leather bag which always contained an auto-
matic handgun. Poms stepped off the elevator in the apartment
building to find that federal agents had arrested Brobow. One
agent saw Poms as the elevator door opened, saw the brown leather
bag, identified Poms, and seized the bag. Upon discovering cocaine
and an automatic pistol in the bag, the officer arrested Poms.
The court held that the search of Poms' bag was a justifiable
Terry procedure and insisted that Terry supported this automatic
search. This 1973 holding by the Fourth Circuit furthered the au-
tomatic companion rule, especially by citing Berryhill with
approval.27
It has been argued that United States v. Simmons28 supports the
automatic companion rule.29 However, because the court in Sim-
mons declined to follow the rule set down in Berryhill, the case does
not support an automatic companion rule.3 0 In Simmons, police of-
ficers traced the defendant, suspected of armed robbery, to a hotel.
They arrested him in his room, then searched the bed and the
purse of the woman who was in the room with the defendant. The
court limited its holding to these specific facts: "[A] search of
items within the area of immediate control of a person who is pres-
ent during a custodial arrest for a recent crime in which guns were
used is reasonable when an objective probability of danger to law
enforcement exists under the circumstances." 3 1 Because of the
24 Id.
25 See notes 9-14 supra and accompanying text.
26 484 F.2d 919 (4th Cir. 1973).
27 Id. at 922.
28 567 F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1977).
29 See Bell, 762 F.2d at 498 (discussing the Government's argument that Simmons sup-
ports the automatic companion rule).
30 567 F.2d at 318-19. See notes 65-68 infra and accompanying text.
31 567 F.2d at 320.
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court's narrow holding and its refusal to apply the Berryhill exten-
sion of Terry,3 2 the Simmons holding does not support the automatic
companion rule.
The United States Supreme Court's 1979 decision in Ybarra v.
Illinois33 arguably invalidated an automatic companion rule. In
Ybarra, police officers obtained a search warrant for a tavern and its
bartender, who was suspected of dealing in narcotics. While exe-
cuting the warrant, police detained the bar patrons. Upon search-
ing defendant Ybarra, one of the patrons, the police discovered six
packets of heroin. The police arrested Ybarra and he was subse-
quently convicted of unlawful possession of a controlled substance.
The Supreme Court reversed Ybarra's conviction. The Court
held that the search of Ybarra and the seizure of the heroin were
unconstitutional because the police had no reasonable belief that
Ybarra was armed or involved in criminal activity. The Court stated
that "a person's mere propinquity to others independently sus-
pected of criminal activity does not, without more, give rise to
probable cause to search that person." 34
While the reasoning of Ybarra argues against applying an auto-
matic companion rule, the holding actually referred to quite differ-
ent circumstances than existed in Berryhill, Poms, Simmons, and Bell.
The Court in Ybarra determined whether law enforcement officials
have the right to search an individual solely because the individual
is on the premises for which the police have a valid search war-
rant.35 Whereas, in Berryhill, Poms, Simmons, and Bell, the person
searched was associated with the person arrested rather than simply
being incidentally on the premises. Thus, Ybarra's impact on the
automatic companion rule is minimal.
United States v. Vaughan,36 decided in 1983, may represent the
Ninth Circuit's attempt to resuscitate the automatic companion rule
after Ybarra. In Vaughan, the court held that police officers, having
obtained valid arrest warrants for the driver and one passenger of
an automobile, had the right to detain the second passenger, de-
fendant Vaughan. While the police detained Vaughan, they
searched his briefcase where they found incriminating evidence.
The Vaughan court ultimately rejected the Government's "frisk of
companions" argument, not because the initial detention and frisk
32 Id. See notes 18-25 supra and accompanying text.
33 444 U.S. 85 (1979).
34 Id. at 91.
35 The Illinois statute which authorized the search was declared unconstitutional as ap-
plied in Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. at 97 n. 1. See generally Note, Fourth Amendment Rights of
Persons Present When a Search Warrant is Executed: Ybarra v. Illinois, 66 IoWA L. REv. 453, 455
n.22 (1981) (listing other states with statutes similar to Illinois').
36 718 F.2d 332 (9th Cir. 1983).
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of Vaughan's briefcase were unjustified under the automatic com-
panion rule, but because the officer carried the search too far when
he opened the briefcase. 37 The court held that the officers had the
right to "briefly detain" Vaughan in order to conduct a Tery stop
and frisk to determine that he had no weapons. The court allowed
this even though the officers were ignorant of Vaughan's identity,
had no warrant for his arrest, and were unaware of any involvement
by Vaughan in the drug-smuggling conspiracy for which his com-
panions were arrested.38
The Vaughan case, decided before Bell, appears to support an
automatic companion rule in the Ninth Circuit. The 1985 decision
by the Sixth Circuit in Bell thus established a split among the Cir-
cuits. Bell rejected the automatic companion rule set forth by the
Fourth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits in Poms, Simmons, Benyhill, and
Vaughan by holding that the companion of an arrested felon is not
automatically subject to a pat-down search.
II. Analysis of Bell and the Validity of an Automatic
Companion Rule
In Bell, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) assigned
Agent Snyder to aid in the execution of arrest and search warrants
for Earl Cherry and his van. Cherry was suspected of food stamp,
narcotics, and weapons violations. An unidentified accomplice ac-
companied Cherry while he allegedly committed some of these of-
fenses. The agent believed Cherry was "armed and dangerous."3 9
Snyder and three other FBI agents located Cherry in the
driver's seat of a Cadillac parked in front of a food stamp distribu-
tion center. Defendant-appellant Wayne Bell, who was not known
by the officers, sat in the passenger seat next to Cherry. A number
of people milled about the car. After a brief surveillance, two
agents moved toward the driver's side of the car and arrested
Cherry. Snyder, backed by another agent, moved to the passen-
ger's side. Agent Snyder ordered Bell to place his hands on the
dashboard. Bell did not respond to this or to a subsequent identi-
cal command. Snyder then ordered Bell to get out of the car; Bell
unlocked the door, but did not open it, staring "defiantly" at the
agent.40 Snyder then opened the car door and removed Bell.
When Bell did not respond to a command to place his hands on the
roof of the car, Snyder turned him around and put his hands on the
37 Id. at 333.
38 Id. at 334.
39 The agents wore protective vests throughout their search for Cherry. 762 F.2d at
496.
40 Id. at 497.
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car. Snyder then frisked Bell.4 1 The agent found a small automatic
handgun in Bell's jacket pocket. He arrested Bell for allegedly vio-
lating an ordinance prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapons.
Because of a prior felony conviction, Bell was indicted as a con-
victed felon carrying a firearm.42
At the hearing on the admissibility of the firearm, the magis-
trate recommended that the gun be inadmissible as evidence.43
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio
affirmed, with modifications, the magistrate's decision.44
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit re-
fused to accept the Government's assertion that the search which
revealed the handgun was proper based solely upon Bell's presence
in the automobile when the police arrested Cherry.45 The court
found the search reasonable, however, based upon traditional
fourth amendment analysis. Given the totality of the circum-
stances, the court found that Snyder reasonably perceived that Bell
may have posed a risk of danger to the agents and others present at
the scene.46
The Sixth Circuit, in reaching its decision, stated that Terry v.
Ohio did not support an automatic companion rule:
As to the propriety of the "automatic companion" rule, we do
not believe that the Terry requirement of reasonable suspicion
under the circumstances ... has been eroded to the point that
an individual may be frisked based upon nothing more than an
unfortunate choice of associates. 47
41 Id.
42 Id. Bell was convicted under 18 U.S.C. app. § 1202(a) (1976).
43 Agent Snyder agreed that nothing indicated that Bell had a weapon until Snyder felt
it during the frisk. The only basis for the frisk was that Bell was in the company of a suspect
considered armed and dangerous and Bell's failure to respond to Snyder's commands to
put his hands on the dashboard. The magistrate, relying heavily on Ybarra (see text accom-
panying notes 33-35 supra) concluded that the Government had not met its burden of show-
ing that the frisk was reasonable. 762 F.2d at 497-98.
44 The district court felt that the Government's case was weaker than the magistrate
suggested. The record did not support the fact that Agent Snyder admitted that he did not
recognize Bell as the unidentified male accomplice and Bell did eventually unlock the car
door. Id. at 498.
45 Id. at 499.
46 The Bell court cited five factors which it held satisfied the Teny requirement that Bell
posed a physical threat to Agent Snyder and others in the vicinity of the car:
(1) Cherry was known to be potentially armed and dangerous; (2) Bell was in the
Cadillac with Cherry; (3) Bell could not be ruled out as Cherry's accomplice of the
week before; (4) the car was parked in a relatively crowded place, with people
milling around it; and (5) Bell refused to comply with the agent's commands while
staring at him "defiantly."
Id. at 502.
47 Id. at 499 (citation omitted). The Bell court concluded that companionship can be a
factor in determining the legitimacy of a frisk, but companionship cannot be the sole legiti-
mizing factor. Id. at 499 n.4. The Bell court recognized that a patron in a bar, as in Ybarra,
has no necessary connection with the bartender under suspicion. On the other hand, "one
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The police officer in Terry observed the suspicious activities of
three men. The men were clearly together, and acted in such a
manner as to reasonably raise a suspicion in the mind of an exper-
ienced officer that a potential for criminal activity existed. In begin-
ning a cursory investigation of the situation, the officer's suspicions
were furthered, thus justifying a self-protective frisk for weapons. 48
The Sixth Circuit in Bell noted that an automatic companion
rule "is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's observation that it
'has been careful to maintain [the] narrow scope' of Terry's excep-
tion to the warrant requirement." 49 In Dunaway v. New York, 50 the
Supreme Court again emphasized the narrowness of the Terry ex-
ception. Without a warrant, police officers took defendant Duna-
way, a homicide suspect, to the station for questioning. The State
argued that it had made a Terry detention rather than an arrest.
The Dunaway Court said Terry departed from traditional fourth
amendment analysis. "Because Terry involved an exception to the
general rule requiring probable cause, this Court has been careful
to maintain its narrow scope." 5 1
In a more recent case, Michigan v. Long,5 2 the Supreme Court
would expect that persons in a... car are there by invitation or consent." Id. (quoting
Vaughan, 718 F.2d at 335 n.6). Thus, Bell could be used to argue that proximity can be
given more weight in circumstances where the people are clearly together in a demonstra-
ble relationship.
48 392 U.S. at 7. The suspects had been loitering within the same vicinity for an ex-
tended period of time. When the officer approached the suspects and requested identifica-
tion, the men "mumbled something" and failed to comply with his request. These
circumstances further aroused the officer's suspicions that the two men were "casing a job,
a stick-up" and that they might be armed. Id. at 6-7. The Supreme Court in Sibron v. New
York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968), a companion case to Teny, clarified the issue of companionship in
Teny. The Court stated that merely being in the company of known narcotics addicts did
not give rise to reasonable fear to justify a Terry search: "The suspect's mere act of talking
with a number of known narcotics addicts over an eight-hour period no more gives rise to a
reasonable fear of life or limb on the part of the police officer than it justifies an arrest for
committing a crime." Id. at 64. See note 16 supra. See also United States v. Clay, 640 F.2d
147 (8th Cir. 1981). In Clay, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held
unreasonable the search of a man approaching a house on the basis that: (1) he might be a
companion of the owner; (2) the officer had an opportunity for inquiry as the defendant
approached; and (3) inquiry should have been made before frisking. The court held that
"[a]n officer is not warranted in relying upon circumstances deemed by him suspicious,
when the means are at hand to either verify or dissipate those suspicions without risk." Id.
at 161.
49 762 F.2d at 499 (citing Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979)).
50 442 U.S. 200 (1979). A Rochester, New York police detective had received informa-
tion that Dunaway was a possible suspect in a homicide, but learned nothing that supplied
"enough information to get a warrant" for Dunaway's arrest. Id. at 203. Nevertheless, the
detective ordered others to "pick up" Dunaway and "bring him in." The Court ruled that a
subsequent confession was invalid, because the detention constituted an illegal seizure. Id.
at 219.
51 Id. at 210.
52 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). After seeing respondent Long's vehicle driving erratically and
then swerve off the road, police officers stopped to investigate. Long appeared to be
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reiterated that Terry searches are limited in scope. The Court held
that an area search for weapons based upon articulable suspicion
did not exceed this narrow scope. The Court emphasized that po-
lice may not conduct Terry searches without articulable suspicion
that the intrusion is justified, and that Terry searches must remain
limited protective weapons searches.5 3
The Bell court stated that in addition to exceeding the narrow
scope of the Terry exception, an automatic companion rule may not
be constitutional in light of existing precedent.5 4 Specifically, the
Bell court looked at the Di Re and Ybarra decisions of the Supreme
Court.
In Di Re, the Supreme Court refused to adopt a rule that mere
presence in a suspected car stripped a person of fourth amendment
protections.55 In Ybarra, the Supreme Court required "a reason-
able belief that [the suspect] was armed and presently dangerous"
as a prerequisite to a pat-down search for weapons. 56 Because the
Government in Bell failed to contest the continued validity of Di Re
and Ybarra, the Sixth Circuit found that these Supreme Court cases
weakened the Government's argument for an automatic companion
rule.57
The Sixth Circuit in Bell also examined the decisions of the
"under the influence." Id at 1036. The officers noticed a hunting knife on the floor of the
car and thus conducted a Terry pat-down. Long carried no weapons, but a Terry-type search
of the car yielded a pouch of marijuana. Long was convicted of possession of marijuana.
The Supreme Court reinstated the conviction (which had been affirmed by the appeals
court, then reversed by the Michigan Supreme Court), holding that the officers had the
authority to conduct an area search of the passenger compartment to uncover weapons
when they reasonably believed that the suspect might be dangerous. Id. at 1051.
53 Id. at 1052 n.16. Although dissenting in Long, Justice Brennan agreed that the Court
should read Terry narrowly. Id. at 1055-56 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Florida v.
Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 509-11 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring in the result); Kolender v.
Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 364-65 (1983) (Brennan,J., concurring); United States v. Place, 462
U.S. 697 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring in the result).
54 762 F.2d at 498.
55 332 U.S. at 593. See notes 9-14 supra and accompanying text.
56 444 U.S. at 92-93. The Court stated that:
Where the standard is probable cause, a search or seizure of a person must be
supported by probable cause particularized with respect to that person. This re-
quirement cannot be undercut or avoided by simply pointing to the fact that coin-
cidentally there exists probable cause to search or seize another or to search the
premises where the person may happen to be.
Id. at 91. See notes 33-35 supra and accompanying text.
57 762 F.2d at 499. The Bell court, however, noted that the facts of Ybarra differed from
its own. Id. at 499 n.4. Among the distinguishing factors were: (1) There was no demon-
strable relationship between Ybarra and the bartender, id., while there is a presumption of a
relationship between people in an automobile, see Vaughan, 713 F.2d at 335 n.6; and (2)
Ybarra made no gestures indicative of criminal conduct and acted in a non-threatening
manner. 762 F.2d at 499 n.4. In contrast, Bell ignored two direct commands, staring "defi-
antly" at the FBI agent. Id. at 497. The court did not point out these additional differ-
ences: In Ybarra, the frisk occurred subsequent to a search warrant, 444 U.S. at 92, while in
Bell the frisk came after reasonable suspicion had been raised, 762 F.2d at 502. Further-
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Ninth, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits in Berryhill, Poms, and Simmons
which all upheld the automatic companion rule. The Bell court ar-
gued, however, that such "automatic companion" language was "in
each case dictum unnecessary to the court's holding."5
In Berryhill, the Ninth Circuit dealt with the admission of evi-
dence seized from an individual not charged with a crime.59 Mr.
Berryhill did not have standing to claim that the police violated his
wife's fourth amendment rights because the police searched her
purse.60 The issue in Berryhill was therefore not companionship but
standing.
In Poms, the Fourth Circuit first made a traditional Terry analy-
sis of reasonableness under the circumstances. The officers had re-
liable information that Poms always carried a weapon in a brown
shoulder bag. The officer searched the bag after Poms reached into
it.61 The court concluded that "this limited protective search was
justified under the circumstances." 62 Only after having conducted
a Terry analysis did the Pows court cite to Berryhill and purport to
adopt the automatic companion rule. Having satisfied the Terry re-
quirements, the court did not need to adopt an automatic compan-
ion rule. The officer had identified Poms, knew that he was a
suspected criminal associate of Brobow, and reasonably believed
that Poms carried a weapon. The court itself reaffirmed that the
circumstances justified this search.63 Because this search was not
automatic, the court did not have to apply an automatic companion
rule to reach its decision.
In Simmons, the Seventh Circuit examined the validity of a pro-
tective sweep. The Government urged the adoption of Berryhill, ar-
more, in Ybarra, the Illinois statute authorized officers to frisk persons present during the
execution of a search warrant. 444 U.S. at 92. No such statute existed in Bell..
58 762 F.2d at 498.
59 Mrs. Berryhill was not charged with a crime. The checks seized from her purse were
used as evidence against her husband. See notes 18-25 supra and accompanying text.
60 Even if Mr. Berryhill had a sufficient privacy interest to challenge the search of his
wife's purse, this challenge would likely have failed. The court indicated that it would have
found the search incident to a lawful arrest. The court seems to argue that the evidence
seized could not be used against Mrs. Berryhill because of Di Re, but can be used against
Mr. Berryhill because of an automatic companion rule. The court itself, however, based its
decision on the alternative grounds of either no standing to challenge or a search incident
to a lawful arrest. Consequently, the court did not need to reach the issue of an automatic
companion rule. The Berryhill court purported to distinguish Di Re on the grounds that the
search of Di Re was "a thorough personal search of a companion of one who was lawfully
arrested," while the Berryhill search was more like a Terry frisk: "a limited search for weap-
ons for the protection of the arresting officer." 445 F.2d at 1193. Contrary to the court's
assertion, the police did not search Di Re incident to a lawful arrest because the officers had
no probable cause to infer felonious behavior on the part of Di Re. 332 U.S. at 593-95.
61 484 F.2d at 921.
62 Id. at 922.
63 Id.
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guing in part that "[a]ll companions of the arrestee within the
immediate vicinity, capable of accomplishing a harmful assault on
the officer, are constitutionally subjected to the cursory pat-down
reasonably necessary to give assurance that they are unarmed." 64
The Seventh Circuit responded to this argument: "Our reluctance
to rely on the reasoning urged by the government does not neces-
sarily preclude us from allowing the search in this case." 65 When
they arrested Simmons, the officers noticed someone else in the
room. It was likely that a gun was in the room because Simmons
and his accomplice had brandished weapons during the bank rob-
bery earlier in the afternoon. The officers reasonably believed Sim-
mons' companion might have access to a weapon after seeing a
lump in the bed near the companion. 66 Again, because the court
found the search reasonable under the circumstances, 67 it did not
apply an automatic companion rule, but rather applied the tradi-
tional analysis under Terry. Thus, the cases relied upon by the Gov-
ernment in Bell as supporting an automatic companion rule are not
precedent, but merely dictum.68
The Bell court, although rejecting an automatic companion
rule, still recognizes companionship as one factor in the totality of
the circumstances which can legitimize a Tery stop and frisk.69 Us-
ing this approach, the court concluded that the limited intrusion
into Bell's privacy was justified under the circumstances, and thus
did not offend the fourth amendment.70
III. The Unreasonableness of an Automatic Companion Rule
An automatic companion rule treats companionship as the dis-
positive factor in determining the legitimacy of a Terry search:
"[T]he legality of such a limited intrusion into a citizen's personal
64 567 F.2d at 318-19. See notes 28-32 supra and accompanying text.
65 Id. at 319.
66 Id. at 319-20. The court stated that "[u]nder these circumstances the officers' fear
that a weapon could well be present in the room and that the woman might use it against
them was legitimate and well-supported." Id. at 320.
67 Id. at 319.
68 The Government in Bell also relied upon the Vaughan case as an automatic compan-
ion case. The Bell court accepted Vaughan as setting forth the automatic companion rule.
Like Teny, however, Vaughan was a narrow decision: "Only the facts surrounding the search
and seizure of Vaughan's vinyl briefcase are at issue here." 718 F.2d at 333. The Vaughan
court held that the agents had a right to detain Vaughan and to frisk him for their own
safety but not to search the briefcase. It is unclear from this decision whether the court
based its right to detain and frisk Vaughan on Teny or whether the intrusion was an auto-
matic right. Resolving this issue is not germane to the outcome of the case. The appeal
was expressly limited to review of the constitutionality of the full search of the briefcase.
The Bell court noted that the evidence was suppressed because the real issue was one of a
full search and not a Teny frisk. 762 F.2d 498-99 n.3.
69 See notes 46-47 supra.
70 762 F.2d at 502.
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privacy extends to a criminal's companions at the time of arrest." 7'
The automatic application of such a rule carries with it several risks.
Under this rule, a law enforcement official avoids an analysis of the
totality of the circumstances which can lead to unreasonable
searches proscribed by the fourth amendment.
Companionship is not limited to fact situations identical to Bell.
Companions are found and frisked not only in cars, but also in ho-
tel rooms, 7 2 taverns, 73 and on public streets.74 Searching compan-
ions automatically and in such varied circumstances threatens the
individualized protections provided by the fourth amendment. In
Ybarra, the Supreme Court stated that each person is "clothed with
constitutional protection against an unreasonable search or an un-
reasonable seizure." Thus, although the police officers had a war-
rant for the bartender of the tavern, "it gave them no authority
whatever to invade the constitutional protections possessed individ-
ually by the tavern's customers." 75
Because an automatic companion rule would erode such con-
stitutional protections, courts should not widen the narrow Terry
exception to legitimize the automatic companion rule. Justice
Douglas warned of such dangers in his dissent in Terry: "There
have been powerful hydraulic pressures throughout our history that
bear heavily on the Court to water down constitutional guarantees
and give the police the upper hand." 76 Justice Stevens, in his dis-
sent in Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 77 recalled Douglas' warning by bit-
terly attacking the Court's "casual" extension of the narrow Terry
exception.78
The Supreme Court has "consistently refused to sanction" in-
trusions upon guaranteed rights based upon "nothing more sub-
stantial than inarticulable hunches." 79 The conduct of law
71 Berryhill, 445 F.2d at 1193.
72 Simmons, 567 F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1977). See notes 28-32, 64-68supra and accompany-
ing text.
73 Ybarra, 444 U.S. 85 (1979). See notes 33-35 supra and accompanying text.
74 Terry, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). See notes 15-17 supra and accompanying text.
75 444 U.S. at 92 (emphasis added).
76 392 U.S. at 39 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
77 434 U.S. 106 (1977).
78 Justice Stevens stated that:
Today, without argument, the Court adopts still another -and even lesser-stan-
dard ofjustification for a major category of police seizures. More importantly, it
appears to abandon "the central teaching of this Court's Fourth Amendment juris-
prudence" which has ordinarily required individualized inquiry into the particular
facts justifying every police intrusion-in favor of a general rule covering countless
situations. But what is most disturbing is the fact that this important innovation is
announced almost casually, in the course of explaining a summary reversal of a
decision the Court should not even bother to review.
Id. at 115-16 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
79 392 U.S. at 22.
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enforcement officials must be subjected to the detached scrutiny of
ajudicial official "who must evaluate the reasonableness of a partic-
ular search in light of the particular circumstances."80 This strong lan-
guage from Terry underlines the importance of examining the
totality of the circumstances in search and seizure cases.
IV. Conclusion
Even in those cases which purport to authorize an automatic
companion rule, the courts have still looked to the particular facts
which justified the searches.8 1 If courts continue tojustify searches
by looking to the totality of the circumstances, then no need for an
automatic companion rule exists. On the other hand, straightfor-
ward application of the automatic companion rule, without consid-
ering the facts of each case, encourages unreasonable searches
which violate the fourth amendment. Thus, courts should continue
to examine the reasonableness of warrandess searches and frisks
based upon the totality of the circumstances and reject automatic
rules which threaten the individual protections afforded by the
fourth amendment.
David E. Edwards
Suzette M. Nanovic
Francis M. O'Connell
Laura A. Yustak
80 Id. at 21 (emphasis added).
81 Although the courts in Berryhill, Poms, and Simmons purport to authorize the auto-
matic companion rule, all three courts looked to specific facts beyond companionship to
justify the searches. In Benyhill, the purse could reasonably have been a depository for a
weapon. In Poms, the suspect was known to carry a weapon in his shoulderbag. In Simmons,
the suspect had allegedly been involved in a violent crime in which weapons had been used.
See notes 18-32, 59-68 supra and accompanying text.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-G. & A. BOOKS, INc. V. STERN: RELE-
VANCE OF IMPROPER MOTIVE TO FIRST AMENDMENT INCIDENTAL IN-
FRINGEMENT CLAIMS
Local governments usually have broad latitude in land use
planning. Courts generally defer to local government decisions
both in formulating land use goals and in devising means to attain
those goals. This deference must give way, however, when land use
planning infringes on a constitutionally protected right.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently faced this
issue in G. &A. Books, Inc. v. Stern,1 when sellers of sexually explicit
material sought to enjoin the city from condemning their property
to initiate the Times Square Redevelopment Project. 2 The plain-
tiffs produced evidence that the defendants disliked the materials
sold in the plaintiffs' stores. The court, however, refused to con-
sider defendants' motivation for the project, looking only at the ef-
fects of the project.
Part I of this comment outlines the facts and holding of G. & A.
Books. Part II then traces the development and integration of the
doctrines of eminent domain and freedom of speech. Finally, Part
III concludes that in addressing improper motivation in eminent
domain actions which infringe on protected speech, courts should
apply the test employed by the United States Supreme Court in Mt.
Healthy School District v. Doyle.3 This test best protects first amend-
ment rights.
I. G. & A. Books, Inc. v. Stern
Plaintiffs operated businesses which sold sexually explicit ma-
terial in the Times Square area of New York City. They sought to
1 770 F.2d 288 (2d Cir. 1985), aff'g 604 F. Supp. 898 (S.D.N.Y.).
2 Two other cases arose from this same redevelopment project. In Rosenthal & Ro-
senthal, Inc. v. New York State Urban Development Corp., 605 F. Supp. 612 (S.D.N.Y.
1985), plaintiffs, owners of a structurally sound building, challenged condemnation pro-
ceedings under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). They argued that the taking of their building did
not serve a public purpose, and that it was done solely to make money for private develop-
ers. Relying on Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954), and Hawaii Housing Authority v.
Midkiff, 104 S. Ct. 2321 (1984), the court held that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim for
relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
In Forty-Second Street Co. v. Koch, 613 F. Supp. 1416 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), movie opera-
tors challenged the redevelopment plan on first amendment and equal protection grounds.
Although the city was condemning plaintiffs' businesses, the theater buildings housing
those businesses were slated for renovation, not destruction. The court held that the plan
was neither racially discriminatory nor unnecessarily suppressive of free speech. The taking
was, therefore, constitutional. The court noted that plaintiffs' disputes related mainly to
questions of policy which were best settled by the legislature, not the judiciary.
3 429 U.S. 274 (1977). See notes 100-12 infra and accompanying text.
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enjoin condemnation proceedings4 initiated by the Times Square
Redevelopment Corporation (defendant).5 Plaintiffs alleged that
defendants undertook the redevelopment project because they
were hostile toward the plaintiffs' materials. Plaintiffs argued that
the project was designed to stop the distribution of pornography.
The Times Square Redevelopment Project (Project) encom-
passed thirteen acres between 40th and 42nd Streets, bounded by
Broadway and Eighth Avenue. Approximately 400 businesses6
have been condemned to make way for a hotel, renovated theaters,
four office towers, and a wholesale merchandise mart. Prior to any
condemnations, the Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS)
for the Project illustrated the need for redevelopment. The city
had developed only one-third of the area's potential zoning capac-
ity and no new major construction had taken place in fifty years.
The redevelopment was expected to create 21,000 jobs in the area,
an increase of approximately 17,000. The city also expected to gain
an additional $650 million in taxes and payments over twenty years
time.7
In addition to its statistical data, the FEIS also illustrated the
government's hostility toward pornography. The district court
found that "there [was] sufficient evidence in public documents
concerning the Project to show that the government defendants
[had] an official policy of hostility toward adult uses." 8 The court,
however, concluded that eradicating pornography was not the Pro-
ject's primary purpose. 9 The court stated that "[i]t strains credibil-
ity to assert that the City and State would undertake such a massive
project.., to rid Times Square of a handful of pornographic book-
4 To obtain a preliminary injunction, plaintiffs had to first demonstrate an irreparable
harm, and then "either a likelihood of success on the merits or substantial questions going
to the merits and a balance of hardships tilting in their favor." 604 F. Supp. at 907. The
district court found that the imminent destruction of the plaintiffs' businesses constituted a
sufficient harm. But the court, after examining the merits of plaintiffs' claims, denied their
motion for injunctive relief. Finding that no material questions of fact remained, the court
treated defendants' motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment and granted
judgment for defendants as a matter of law. Id. at 914.
5 The New York State Urban Development Corporation Act, N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAwS
§§ 6251-6285 (McKinney 1979), established the Urban Development Commission to elimi-
nate blight and increase opportunity through cooperation with private enterprise. Defend-
ants in this action were various public officials, public corporations, and private developers
involved in the Project.
6 Among those 400 businesses were four adult theaters and fifteen businesses involved
in distributing pornography. 770 F.2d at 291.
7 Without the Project, the city could expect no more than $123 million from the Times
Square area. The FEIS estimated that the Project would generate over $776 million in
revenue. 604 F. Supp. at 903.
8 Id. at 905.
9 Plaintiffs alleged that eradicating pornography was a major motivation for the Pro-
ject, not the primary motivation. The district court did not reach any conclusion on
whether hostility toward adult uses was a major motivation for the Project.
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stores and a few adult movie theaters."10 The court also concluded
that the condemnation proceedings were not content-based be-
cause defendants did not single out plaintiffs' speech for special
treatment." The Project, the court reasoned, would displace all
types of businesses, and a few of those businesses happened to be
adult uses.
Although restriction of pornography was not its primary pur-
pose, the Project did infringe on protected speech.' 2 To test the
constitutionality of this infringement, the court applied the four-
part test set out in United States v. O'Brien.13 Both the district court' 4
and the court of appeals15 used the O'Brien test as applied by Justice
Powell in his concurring opinion in Young v. American Mini Theatres,
Inc. 16
The O'Brien test first requires that the condemning party have
the constitutional power to take property by eminent domain.' 7 In
G. &A. Books, the plaintiffs did not dispute the Urban Development
Commission's power to take their property.' 8 Second, the O'Brien
test requires the government to show a substantial interest in the
property.19 The court found that the state's interest in eliminating
physical and social blight satisfied this second element.20
Third, the O'Brien test requires that the government interest be
unrelated to the suppression of free expression.2 1 The district
court found that the Project goals, "in and of themselves [were]
substantial, important, and unrelated to the suppression of free
10 604 F. Supp. at 905.
11 Id. at 909.
12 The district court stated that, "[t]here is no doubt that plaintiffs engage in activities
protected by the First Amendment. Films ... all kinds of publications ... and nude dancing
... are all protected forms of expression." Id. (citations omitted).
13 391 U.S. 367 (1968). The O'Brien test has become the standard for determining the
constitutionality of government regulations which incidentally infringe on protected
speech. See notes 62-65 infra and accompanying text.
14 604 F. Supp. at 908.
15 770 F.2d at 294.
16 427 U.S. 50, 73 (1976). See notes 66-74 infra and accompanying text.
17 391 U.S. at 377.
18 770 F.2d at 296. Plaintiffs seldom contest the government's constitutional power. A
case like G. &A. Books, however, does merit more than a cursory consideration of this ele-
ment. The political branches have the power to exercise eminent domain. But, arguably,
they should not have the authority to do so when the act is motivated by hostility toward
protected speech. "Should Congress, under the pretext of executing its powers, pass laws
for the accomplishment of objects not entrusted to the government; it would become the
painful duty of this tribunal ... to say that such an act was not the law of the land." McCul-
loch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 423 (1819). By using legitimate means (eminent
domain) to accomplish an illegitimate end (eradication of pornography), a government ac-
tor would move outside the sphere of objects entrusted to the government.
19 391 U.S. at 377-81.
20 770 F.2d at 296.
21 391 U.S. at 377, 381-82.
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speech." 22 The court noted that "only the legitimate, non-speech
goals of fighting blight and crime will be factored into the bal-
ance .... [Illegitimate] justifications for the Project must be dis-
counted under the O'Brien test." 23 The court of appeals stated that
"subjective motivation on the part of some proponents of the Pro-
ject to suppress sex-related businesses does not render it unconsti-
tutional, provided the Project is justified by substantial government
interests independent of such motive." 24
Finally, the O'Brien test requires the government to employ the
least restrictive means available to achieve its goal.2 5 Because of
numerous failed attempts to revitalize Times Square, the court
found that the Project employed the least restrictive means avail-
able.26 The court reasoned that a less drastic plan would not
achieve the Project's legitimate goals.27
Finding all four prongs of the O'Brien test satisfied, the district
court held that the condemnation of the plaintiffs' buildings was
constitutional. 28 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, ap-
plying a similar analysis, affirmed.29
II. Development and Integration of Land Use and First
Amendment Law
A. Land Use Planning
As the district court noted, G. & A. Books involved two strains
of constitutional law-judicial deference on land use issues and first
amendment rights.,3 The first strain, judicial deference on land use
issues, derives from the state's police power: its interest in promot-
ing the health, safety, morals, or general welfare of the commu-
nity.3 ' Euclid v. Amber Realty Co.32 upheld a local zoning ordinance as
a legitimate exercise of the police power because the public interest
in separating industrial from residential uses outweighed the reduc-
tion in property value imposed on the plaintiff.33 Municipalities ob-
22 604 F. Supp. at 910.
23 Id. at 910-11.
24 770 F.2d at 297.
25 391 U.S. at 381.
26 604 F. Supp. at 911.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 770 F.2d at 298.
30 604 F. Supp. at 901.
31 Zahn v. Board of Public Works, 274 U.S. 325 (1927).
32 272 U.S. 365 (1926). The owner of an unimproved lot unsuccessfully challenged a
zoning ordinance on the grounds that it deprived him of liberty and property without due
process of law. The Court held that a land use regulation violates the due process clause if
it is "clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health,
safety, morals, or general welfare." Id. at 395.
33 Id. at 389-90.
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tain their power to zone through state enabling acts.3 4 Consistent
with the decision in Euclid, courts generally defer to municipalities
on zoning decisions.3 5
In Berman v. Parker,3 6 the United States Supreme Court ex-
tended the judicial deference accorded to zoning decisions to emi-
nent domain proceedings. The plaintiffs in Berman argued that
condemnation proceedings were not undertaken for a public use,
thus violating the fifth amendment.3 7 The Court, in upholding the
condemnation, stated that:
[T]he legislature, not the judiciary, is the main guardian of the
public needs to be served by social legislation .... This princi-
ple admits of no exception merely because the power of emi-
nent domain is involved. The role of the judiciary in
determining whether that power is being exercised for a public
purpose is an extremely narrow one.3 8
The Supreme Court reiterated its Berman holding in Hawaii
Housing Authority v. Midkiff3 9 Should the legislature determine that
a taking will serve a substantial public purpose, courts must defer to
this determination. 40 The Court, in Midkif, held that the rational
basis test was the appropriate standard for determining the consti-
34 See generally 2 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 3.09 (1968).
35 Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974). In Boraas, the Court upheld a
local zoning ordinance which limited occupancy of single-family dwellings. The Court held
that economic and social legislation, including zoning laws, will withstand due process or
equal protection attacks if the law is reasonable, not arbitrary, and if the law is rationally
related to a permissible state objective. Id. at 8.
In Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977), the Court struck down a local
zoning ordinance which, by restricting the definition of "family," prevented a grandmother
from having her grandson live with her. Zoning laws must bear a rational relationship to a
valid governmental interest and must serve that interest effectively. Id. at 499-500.
36 348 U.S. 26 (1954). Appellants owned buildings which were condemned to make
way for a redevelopment project having both public and private ownership. They chal-
lenged the constitutionality of the District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945, D.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 5-701 through 5-719 (1951), as applied to the taking of their property. The
Court, in upholding the Act, held that the legislative branch may take into account aesthetic
considerations, as well as considerations of health and welfare, when enacting redevelop-
ment legislation.
37 The fifth amendment provides, in pertinent part, that "[n]o person shall be... de-
prived of ... property without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. In Chicago, Burlington &
Quincy Ry. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897), the Court, through the fourteenth amend-
ment, extended the just compensation requirement to the states.
38 348 U.S. at 32.
39 104 S. Ct. 2321 (1984). Hawaii's feudal past had resulted in land ownership being
concentrated in a few families. To remedy this situation, the state legislature passed a stat-
ute which allowed tenants to seek a state condemnation action against the land they were
leasing. The action, if approved by a state board, would eventually result in the tenant
taking title in fee simple. Private landowners, the lessors, challenged the constitutionality
of that statute.
40 Id. at 2331.
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tutionality of a taking.41 Midkiff gives the states wide latitude in the
exercise of the eminent domain power.
B. First Amendment
The second strain of constitutional law which G. & A. Books in-
volves derives from the first amendment. In contrast to the state's
land use and eminent domain authority, courts are less willing to
defer to the legislative branch when government action infringes on
the fundamental right of free speech.42 The first amendment pro-
hibits the government from taking any action which unduly in-
fringes on the free exercise of speech.43 "But, above all else, the
first amendment means that government has no power to restrict
expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its
content." 44
Infringement on free speech falls into two categories depend-
ing on the government purpose which underlies the infringing ac-
tion. Infringement can be either content-based, singling out
speech for special treatment, or incidental, impacting speech inad-
vertently while attempting to achieve a public purpose. Govern-
ment action which is content-based bears a heavy presumption of
unconstitutionality. 45  In Near v. Minnesota ex rel Olson,46 the
41 The taking must be "rationally related to a conceivable public purpose." Id. at 2329.
The Court upheld the statute as a rational approach to correcting a market failure.
42 Police Dept. of City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 101 n.30 (1972). The Court
affirmed a court of appeals decision invalidating a city ordinance prohibiting all picketing
near schools, except peaceful labor picketing. The Court held that the ordinance was an
impermissible content-based distinction.
43 "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech .... U.S. CONST.
amend I. In Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925), the Supreme Court applied the
first amendment protection of freedom of expression to the states through the fourteenth
amendment.
44 408 U.S. at 95.
45 Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963). Authorized by state statue,
the Rhode Island Commission to Encourage Morality in Youth had been blackballing objec-
tionable material and then enforcing their decisions by seeking the cooperation of distribu-
tors. The Court held that the chilling effect of such informal censorship was an
unconstitutional prior restaint because the Commission's decisions were not subject to ju-
dicial review.
The presumption of unconstitutionality exists because of the Supreme Court's prefer-
ence that truth be proven in the marketplace of ideas. Justice Holmes made the classic
statement on the marketplace rationale in his dissenting opinion in Abrams v. United
States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919):
But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may
come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own
conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-
that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their
wishes safely can be carried out.
Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (cited with approval in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,
395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969)).
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Supreme Court overturned a state nuisance statute which allowed
officials to bring abatement actions against a "malicious, scandal-
ous, and defamatory newspaper, magazine, or other periodical." 47
The Court held that censorship was not the appropriate method to
protect citizens from "miscreant purveyors of scandal."48 Society's
interest in an unrestrained press outweighs its concern for shield-
ing individuals from falsehood.49 Libel actions provide an adequate
remedy for injuries caused by publication.5 0 Nevertheless, courts
generally uphold legislation which restricts expression when the
legislature directs the statute toward unprotected speech.5' The
government, however, has the burden of proving that the restraint
is justified.5 2
The Supreme Court, however, has allowed reasonable time,
place, and manner restrictions on constitutionally protected speech
even though the government directed its action at the content of
the speech. 53 The state must prove that the restriction furthers a
significant government interest,54 and, generally, the government's
justifications are closely scrutinized. 55 In Erznoznik v. City ofJackson-
ville,56 the Supreme Court invalidated a city ordinance which pro-
46 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
47 Id. at 701-02.
48 Id. at 720.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 The Supreme Court first developed the concept that the Constitution does not pro-
tect certain categories of speech in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
The Court upheld a state statute which proscribed the use of "fighting words" in public
places, and held that unprotected speech "include[d] the lewd and obscene, the profane,
the libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting' words." Id. at 572.
In Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), the Court specifically placed legally
obscene speech in the unprotected category. The Roth Court upheld a federal statute
which punished the mailing of obscene material. The Court defined legal obscenity in
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). In Miller, appellant was convicted of mailing unso-
licited, sexually explicit material in violation of a state statute. The Supreme Court vacated
the judgment below and remanded for action consistent with the test announced in its
opinion. The Miller test provides that states may restrict "works which, taken as a whole,
appeal to the prurient interest in sex, which portray sexual conduct in a patently offensive
way, and which, taken as a whole, do not have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value." Id. at 23.
52 New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam).
53 Young, 427 U.S. 50, 63 n.18.
54 Mosley, 408 U.S. at 98.
55 The Court recently reiterated this position in Regan v. Taxation With Representa-
tion of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 547 (1983): "Generally, statutory classifications are
valid if they bear a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose. Statutes are
subjected to a higher level of scrutiny if they interfere with the exercise of a fundamental
right." A nonprofit organization challenged the Internal Revenue Service's rejection of its
application for tax exempt status. The Court, in upholding the rejection, held that granting
tax exemptions only to nonprofit organizations which do not engage in significant lobbying
activities does not violate the first amendment.
56 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
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hibited drive-in movie theaters from exhibiting films containing
nudity when the screen was visible from a public street. The Court
applied strict scrutiny analysis because the ordinance categorized
movies on the basis of content.57 The Court held that the ordi-
nance was an unreasonable time, place, or manner restriction. 58
The city's primary justification, protecting citizens from unwilling
exposure to offensive materials, did not justify the restriction. 59 In
effect, the Court found that the least restrictive means to achieve
that goal was for offended parties to avert their eyes. 60
The second and more frequently litigated form of infringement
is classified as incidental impact on speech. This incidental impact
can occur when the government directs its actions at the noncom-
municative elements of a particular activity. The first amendment is
violated when the process of achieving these noncommunicative
goals has an unduly adverse impact on speech. United States v.
O'Brien61 established the test for judging incidental infringement
cases.
The O'Brien Court held that government action intended to
regulate non-speech conduct which results in incidental limitations
on first amendment speech must meet four criteria: (1) the govern-
ment must possess the constitutional power to take the action; (2)
the action must further an important or substantial government in-
terest; (3) the government interest must be unrelated to the sup-
pression of free expression; and (4) the incidental restrictions on
alleged first amendment freedoms must be no greater than essen-
tial to further the government interest.62 The Court limited6 the
57 Id. at 213. The city did not claim that it was restricting unprotected obscenity.
58 Id. at 217-18.
59 Id. at 212.
60 Id. at 211.
61 391 U.S. 367 (1968). In 1966, petitioner O'Brien burned his draft card on the steps
of the South Boston courthouse. He was convicted of knowing destruction of a selective
service certificate. He argued that his symbolic conduct was protected by the first amend-
ment. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit agreed and reduced his conviction to a
lesser offense. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals decision and reinstated
O'Brien's original conviction because the government's interest in assuring the continued
availability of selective service certificates justified the incidental infringement on O'Brien's
freedom of expression. See also note 13 supra and accompanying text.
62 391 U.S. at 382.
63 Several authors have questioned the appropriateness of using an O'Brien analysis to
assess the constitutionality of government action motivated by an intent to regulate pro-
tected speech. Professor Tribe argues that the O'Brien Court incorrectly labeled the regula-
tion in question as content neutral and erred in applying a less strict test of
constitutionality. Professor Tribe asserts that the regulation should have been recognized
as a restriction aimed at the expression of certain ideas. Thus, the Court should have tested
the regulation under a strict scrutiny analysis. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
597, 685-88 (1978). See also Note, Zoning, Adult Movie Theatres, and the First Amendment: An
Approach to Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 5 HOFSTRA L. REV. 379, 398-400 (1977)
(arguing thatJustice Powell misapplied O'Brien).
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O'Brien analysis to government action designed to regulate the non-
communicative elements of an activity.64 In several subsequent
cases, the Court has found the O'Brien test inappropriate when the
government intends to regulate the communicative rather than the
non-communicative aspects of the proscribed conduct.65
C. Integration of First Amendment and Land Use Issues
In Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc. 66 the Court faced a direct
confrontation between zoning power and freedom of speech. In
holding that a zoning ordinance did not violate the fourteenth
amendment's guarantee of equal protection, Justice Stevens, writ-
ing for the plurality, stated that sexually explicit speech was not as
important as more socially valuable forms of first amendment
speech.67 Sexually explicit speech was thus entitled to less protec-
64 The Court distinguished the facts in O'Brien from prior cases and stated that "the
case at bar is therefore unlike one where the alleged governmental interest in regulating
conduct arises in some measure because the communication allegedly integral to the con-
duct itself is thought to be harmful." 391 U.S. at 382. See also United States v. Albertini,
105 S. Ct. 2897 (1985) (preventing reentry onto a military base to participate in antinuclear
protest after receiving a bar letter from the commanding officer does not violate the first
amendment); Wayte v. United States, 105 S. Ct. 1524 (1985) (selective prosecution arising
from public declaration of intent not to register for the draft does not violate the first
amendment); City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 104 S. Ct. 2118 (1984)
(removal of political placards from public property does not violate the first amendment);
Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (state regulation punishing desecration of the
flag violates the first amendment); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974) (security
related censorship of prisoner mail in federal prisons absent procedural safeguards violates
the first amendment).
65 In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), the Court invalidated government limits on
political contributions and expenditures, holding that such limits violated the first amend-
ment protection of speech. The Court distinguished O'Brien by stating that the "govern-
mental interests advanced in support of the Act involve 'suppressing communication."' Id.
at 17.
In Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980), Justice
Powell declined to apply O'Brien. The utility company questioned the constitutionality of a
commission regulation that prohibited the utility company from inserting public policy leaf-
lets into their monthly billings. Justice Powell concluded that the intent of the regulation
was to protect the customer from hearing the message. Because the regulation was directly
related to the suppression of speech, it was outside the O'Brien rationale. Id. at 542.
66 427 U.S. 50 (1976). The operator of an adult movie theater challenged a Detroit
ordinance prohibiting adult businesses from locating within 1000 feet of each other, or
within 500 feet of a residential area. The Court upheld the ordinance as a reasonable time,
place, or manner restriction because the ordinance furthered a significant government in-
terest-the city's interest in planning and regulating commercial property. See Note, Zoning,
Adult Movie Theatres, and the First Amendment, supra note 63; Note, Young v. American Mini
Theatres, Inc.: A Limit on First Amendment Protection, 12 NEW ENG. L. REV. 391 (1976).
67 Justice Stevens stated that:
[E]ven though we recognize that the First Amendment will not tolerate the total
suppression of erotic materials that have some arguably artistic value, it is manifest
that the society's interest in protecting this type of expression is of a wholly differ-
ent, and lesser, magnitude than the interest in untrammeled political debate....
Whether political oratory or philosophical discussion moves us to applaud or de-
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tion under the fourteenth amendment. 68 Justice Stevens concluded
that sexually explicit speech could be subjected to content-based
time, place, and manner restrictions6 9 as long as the restrictions did
not result in a total ban on sexually explicit materials. 70
Justice Powell concurred in the plurality's result, but not in
their argument regarding lesser protection for sexually explicit
speech.71 Instead, Justice Powell combined an O'Brien analysis with
consideration of the government's motivation72 and the incidental
impact of the regulation 73 before concluding that the ordinance was
constitutional. 74
III. Ramifications of Applying O'Brien to Mixed Motive Cases
The court in G. &A. Books followed Justice Powell's application
in American Mini Theatres of the O'Brien analysis 75 to land use restric-
tions impinging on protected speech.76 The court did not, how-
spise what is said, every schoolchild can understand why our duty to defend the
right to speak remains the same. But few of us would march our sons and daugh-
ters off to war to preserve the citizen's right to see "Specified Sexual Activities"
exhibited in the theaters of our choice.
427 U.S. at 70.
Justice Stevens also held that the ordinance was not an attempt to regulate speech
expressing a certain point of view. All sexually explicit speech, regardless of personal pref-
erence, was equally affected and, therefore, the ordinance was effectively neutral with re-
spect to point of view. Id. at 67-68.
68 Id. at 70-73.
69 Id.
70 The Court confirmed its holding that government action could not result in a total
ban on protected speech in Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981). The
Court declared a town ordinance which totally prohibited live dancing unconstitutional.
The Court held that reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on protected speech
are only valid if alternative access to the expression remains available. Id. at 75-78.
Most lower courts have interpreted American Mini Theatres as prohibiting state action
that results in a total ban on protected speech. See Alexander v. Minneapolis, 531 F. Supp.
1162 (D. Minn. 1982) (zoning restrictions on closeness of adult uses to specified other uses
would have resulted in elimination of 30 of 36 adult uses); Purple Onion, Inc. v. Jackson,
511 F. Supp. 1207 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (Atlanta zoning restriction on location of adult uses was
unconstitutionally vague as it resulted in a two-thirds reduction in number of adult uses).
71 "I do not think we need reach, nor am I inclined to agree with, the holding... that
nonobscene, erotic materials may be treated differently under First Amendment principles
from other forms of protected expression." 427 U.S. at 73 n.1 (Powell, J., concurring).
72 Justice Powell considered the city's motivation for passing the regulation and com-
mented that "Detroit has not embarked on an effort to suppress free expression." Id. at 80.
73 Justice Powell described the ordinance as "an example of innovative land-use regula-
tion, implicating First Amendment concerns only incidentally and to a limited extent." Id.
at 73.
74 Justice Powell concluded that "[a]t most the impact of the ordinance on these inter-
ests is incidental and minimal. Detroit has silenced no message, has invoked no censorship,
and has imposed no limitation upon those who wish to view them." Id. at 78.
75 See notes 71-74 supra and accompanying text.
76 The court described Justice Powell's concurring opinion in American Mini Theatres as
"decisive and influential." 604 F. Supp. at 98. In this way, the court realized the significant
precedential value of a lone concurrence in a 4-1-4 decision.
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ever, adopt Justice Powell's consideration of the additional factors
of improper motivation 77 and the incidental nature of the restric-
tion.78 Because the court in G. & A. Books found that the condem-
nation of businesses engaged in disseminating protected speech
involved a hostile government motive,79 G. &A. Books can be distin-
guished from Supreme Court cases which have applied O'Brien.
The majority of cases applied O'Brien to situations where the gov-
ernment directed its activity solely at conduct separate from pro-
tected speech;80 in G. & A. Books, the government at least partially
directed its activity at eliminating protected speech. Given the
magnitude of the government interest in the Project, G. & A. Books
is correctly decided. The court's refusal to address the govern-
ment's mixed motivation,81 however, sets precedent which results
in inadaquately protecting first amendment rights in future con-
demnation cases.
G. & A. Books thus illustrates the most frequent criticism of the
O'Brien test: its blanket refusal to consider legislative or administra-
tive motivation often leads to questionable results.8 2 John Hart
Ely83 notes that, although ChiefJustice Warren had good reasons in
O'Brien for refusing to invalidate laws passed because of an illegiti-
mate government motivation,8 4 the difficulties present in O'Brien
77 See notes 8, 23-24, and 72 supra and accompanying text.
78 The court discussed the continued availability of similar uses in the Times Square
vicinity but did not address the difference in impact of a regulation which restricted location
(American Mini Theatres) and a permanent condemnation order with no guaranteed right of
relocation (G. & A. Books).
79 See notes 8-10 supra and accompanying text.
80 See notes 64-65 supra and accompanying text.
81 Throughout this comment the authors define mixed motivation as a combination of
both constitutionally legitimate and illegitimate purposes.
82 See Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative
Motive, 1971 Sup. CT. REv. 95; Ely, Legislative And Administrative Motivation in Constitutional
Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970).
83 John Hart Ely is the Dean and Richard E. Lang Professor of Law at Stanford Univer-
sity Law School.
84 In O'Brien, ChiefJustice Warren, writing for the majority, stated that:
Inquiries into congressional motives or purposes are a hazardous matter. When
the issue is simply the interpretation of legislation, the Court will look to state-
ments by legislators for guidance as to the purpose of the legislature, because the
benefit to sound decision-making in this circumstance is thought sufficient to risk
the possibility of misreading Congress' purpose. It is entirely a different matter
when we are asked to void a statute that is, under well-settled criteria, constitu-
tional on its face, on the basis of what fewer than a handful of Congressmen said
about it. What motivates one legislator to make a speech about a statute is not
necessarily what motivates scores of others to enact it, and the stakes are suffi-
ciently high for us to eschew guesswork. We decline to void a statute essentially
on the ground that it is unwise legislation which Congress had the undoubted
power to enact and which could be reenacted in its exact form if the same or an-
other legislator made a "wiser" speech about it.
391 U.S. at 383-84. See Ely, supra note 82, at 1212.
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are not necessarily present in every case.8 5
Paul Brest 86 also argues that courts should invalidate illicitly
motivated laws.8 7 He states that:
[(1) the government is] prohibited from pursuing certain objec-
tives; [(2) that an] illicit objective may determine the outcome of
the decision; [(3) that a person has a] legitimate complaint if [a
law] would not have been adopted but for the decisionmaker's
consideration of illicit objectives; [and (4) that] the court should
presume that [a decisionmaker's] consideration of [an illicit] ob-
jective determined the outcome of [his] decision and should in-
validate the decision in the absence of clear proof to the
contrary.88
Courts considering the issue of motivation have articulated
similar concerns. Justice White, dissenting in Palmer v. Thompson 89
disagreed with the majority's conclusion that a law cannot be invali-
dated because the legislature passed it pursuant to an illicit mo-
tive.90  In Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing
Development Corp.,9 the majority stressed that an illicit legislative
85 Ely, supra note 82, at 1278.
86 Paul Brest is the Kenneth & Harle Montgomery Professor of Clinical Legal Educa-
tion at Stanford University Law School.
87 See Brest, supra note 82. Brest illustrates his argument for allowing courts to con-
sider whether a law was passed because of an illicit motive with the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1970). Brest asserts that "[a]lmost everyone in
Jackson, Mississippi, knew that the city closed its public swimming pools solely to avoid
integration." Brest, supra note 82, at 95. The Supreme Court nevertheless refused to de-
clare the law unconstitutional, stating "this Court has [never] held that a legislative act may
violate equal protection solely because of the motivations of the men who voted for it." 403
U.S. at 224. Although Palmer is an equal protection case that did not involve a free speech
issue, it is relevant here because it demonstrates how a court's refusal to consider motiva-
tion can lead to unfair results in any context.
88 Brest, supra note 82, at 116-17.
89 403 U.S. 217 (1970).
90 Justice White stated:
I am quite unpersuaded by the majority's assertion that it is impermissible to im-
peach the otherwise valid act of closing municipal swimming pools by resort to
evidence of invidious purpose or motive. Congress has long provided civil and
criminal remedies for a variety of official and private misconduct. In various situa-
tions these statutes and our interpretation of them provide that such conduct falls
within the federal proscription only upon proof of forbidden racial motive or
animus.
Id. at 241 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White further noted that:
The circumstances surrounding this action and the absence of other credible rea-
sons for the closing leave little doubt that shutting down the pools was nothing
more or less than a most effective expression of official policy that Negroes and
whites must not be permitted to mingle together when using the services provided
by the city.
Id. (White, J., dissenting).
91 429 U.S. 252 (1977). In Arlington Heights, developers sued local authorities after the
local authorities refused to rezone a tract of land to accommodate multi-family dwellings.
The plaintiffs charged that the rezoning denial was racially discriminatory. The district
court denied the plaintiffs' demand for injunctive and declaratory relief, holding that the
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purpose, even though not the primary motivation behind the law,
may still be relevant in determining its constitutionality. 92
G. &A. Books raises similar concerns. At least some of the city's
goals for the Project were illegitimate. The court, however, sum-
marily stated that the defendants had shown that the government
interest was not related to the suppression of free speech, the third
prong of the O'Brien test.93 O'Brien, as applied in this case, did not
allow the court to probe into the city's motives. The third prong of
the O'Brien test is meaningless unless it imposes a duty upon the
city to demonstrate not only that it had justifiable reasons for the
Project, but that it was not motivated by a desire to suppress free
speech.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has
followed this approach. In Tovar v. Billmeyer,94 the court, applying
O'Brien, held that an issue of fact existed as to whether or not the
city's actions were motivated by the desire to suppress first amend-
ment rights. 95 Moreover, Playtime Theatres, Inc. v. City of Renton,96
held that even though the city's predominate concerns were legiti-
rezoning denial was motivated by a desire to protect property values, not by the prejudice
of local authorities. The court of appeals reversed, finding that the "ultimate effect" of the
rezoning was racially discriminatory. The Supreme Court, Justice Powell writing for the
majority, reversed and remanded the case. The majority opinion held that the plaintiffs
failed to prove that a racially discriminatory intent or purpose was a motivating factor in the
defendants' decision. Again, this is an equal protection, not a free speech case. See note 87
supra.
92 429 U.S. at 563-65.
93 The court, in establishing the substantial state interest required by the second
prong, listed the Project's goals: eliminating physical and social blight, preserving historic
landmarks, bringing new people into the neighborhood, and increasing the area's tax base.
The court then stated: "[T]hese goals, in and of themselves, [were] substantial, important,
and unrelated to the suppression of free speech, thus satisfying the third strand of the
O'Brien analysis." 604 F. Supp. at 910. The court essentially merged the second and third
prongs of the O'Brien test.
94 721 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 223 (1985). In Tovar, the plain-
tiff brought an action challenging zoning decisions that prevented the operation of an adult
bookstore. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the city, and the plain-
tiff appealed. The court of appeals reversed, stating:
The district court must . . . determine at trial whether a motivating factor in the
zoning decision was to restrict plaintiffs' exercise of first amendment rights. If a
motivating reason for the Council's actions was to prevent the theater from operat-
ing, then the zoning decision would violate the first amendment. Purposeful at-
tempts to suppress protected expression are unconstitutional.
721 F.2d at 1266 (citing Ebel v. City of Corona, 698 F.2d 390, 393 (9th Cir. 1983) (empha-
sis added)).
95 721 F.2d at 1260.
96 748 F.2d 527 (9th Cir. 1984), prob. juris noted, 105 S. Ct. 2015 (1985). In Renton, the
purchaser of existing theaters sought a declaration that the city's zoning ordinance which
regulated adult movie theatres unconstitutionally infringed on free speech. After a compli-
cated procedural history, the Ninth Circuit held that because the city had failed to prove the
zoning laws were unrelated to the suppression of free speech, the O'Brien test was not
satisfied.
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mate, the O'Brien test was not satisfied.97 The court required the
city to demonstrate that it was not motivated in any way by a desire
to suppress protected speech. 98
If G. &A. Books correctly applied the O'Brien test, then the con-
cerns voiced by Ely, Brest, and Justice White are valid.99 The test
announced by the Supreme Court in Mt. Healthy School District v.
Doyle 100 better protects first amendment interests in the land use
context. The Mt. Healthy test places the initial burden on the plain-
tiff to establish that suppression of his constitutionally protected
speech was a motivatingfactor'0 in the government's decision to act.
After the plaintiff establishes an impermissible motive, the Mt.
Healthy doctrine then shifts the burden to the government to prove
that it would have reached the same decision absent the illegitimate
motive. 0 2 Thus, Mt. Healthy protects first amendment rights better
than O'Brien. -Although both Mt. Healthy and O'Brien involved the
possibility of mixed government motives, 10 3 only Mt. Healthy sought
to scrutinize those motives.
Because the government interests were so substantial and the
facts so persuasive, had the Second Circuit applied Mt. Healthy in G.
& A. Books the result would likely remain the same. Arguably,
O'Brien, as applied in this case, allows the government to purposely
infringe on a citizen's constitutional rights through condemnation
proceedings. By spending exhorbitant amounts of money to ex-
pand a project's scope, the government can cover its tracks by
showing that the resulting redevelopment project will greatly bene-
fit the public. The government can then argue that regardless of its
true motives, compared to the benefits of the project, the infringe-
97 748 F.2d at 538.
98 The Ninth Circuit stated:
The district court upheld the ordinance on the ground that Renton's predominate
concerns were legitimate. But that is not the test in this Circuit. Where mixed
motives are apparent, as they are here, Tovar requires that the court determine
whether a "motivating factor" in the zoning decision was to restrict plaintiffs' exer-
cise of first amendment rights.
Id. at 537 (quoting Tovar, 721 F.2d at 1266).
99 See notes 82-90 supra and accompanying text.
100 429 U.S. 274 (1977). The plaintiff, a school teacher, sued the school board after the
board did not renew his teaching contract. The plaintiff alleged that the school board re-
fused to rehire him in retaliation for the exercise of his first amendment rights. Prior to the
board's decision the plaintiff, among other things, had a fight with another teacher prompt-
ing a teacher walk-out, created a disturbance in the cafeteria over the amount of spaghetti
served to him, made obscene gestures to female students, and complained to a local radio
station about the school's dress code for teachers.
101 Id. at 287 (citing Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp.,
429 U.S. 252, 270-71 (1977)).
102 429 U.S. at 287.
103 Professor Ely notes that Congress passed the draft card burning law tested in O'Brien
immediately after the "first publicized draft card burnings." Ely, supra note 82, at 1339. He
concludes that it is impossible to prove illegitimate purpose with this timing factor. Id.
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ment on constitutional rights was incidental. The O'Brien test
therefore creates the possibility of reaching illegitimate ends
through legitimate means. 10 4 When the free speech infringed upon
is unpopular, and the government's pretextual benefits from rede-
velopment are substantial, the government will always win under an
O'Brien analysis as applied in G. & A. Books.
On the other hand, the Mt. Healthy test concentrates on what
motivated the government to undertake a particular action. This
test requires the court, in the case of mixed motives, 05 to deter-
mine whether the government's illegitimate motives were so sub-
stantial that, in their absence, it would not have chosen to engage in
a particular project or enact a particular law.' 06 By concentrating
on motivation rather than impact, Mt. Healthy effectively prohibits
the government from using its monetary resources to mask an ille-
gitimate purpose. 10 7
Finally, Mt. Healthy does not require courts to scrutinize "unas-
certainable" government motives.' 0 8 Once plaintiffs prove illegiti-
mate motives, as Mt. Healthy requires, the government's motives are
ascertained. Then, the only remaining issue is the extent of influ-
ence that these motives had upon the government. It is not unrea-
sonable to require the government to prove that it would have
reached the same decision based on legitimate motives alone after a
citizen proves that illegitimate motives were indeed present.
Applying the Mt. Healthy test instead of the O'Brien test to a
situation like G. &A. Books would have significant procedural ramifi-
cations. After the plaintiff established that impermissible motives
were involved in the government's decision, an issue of fact would
exist as to whether or not those motives were so substantial that the
government would not have reached the same decision in their ab-
sence. The existence of this issue of fact would preclude summary
judgment. 0 9 Thus, the Mt. Healthy test may encourage plaintiffs to
challenge the government's exercise of eminent domain. 1 0 Be-
cause a court is not likely to grant the government summary judg-
104 See note 18 supra.
105 See note 81 supra.
106 See notes 101-02 supra and accompanying text.
107 Even under Mt. Healthy, the government could still attempt to use its resources to
disguise the amount of influence that illicit motives actually exerted on the decision in ques-
tion. But public environmental impact statement hearings make this much more difficult.
The Mt. Healthy test, therefore, still provides greater protection than the O'Brien test.
108 This was one of the main reasons why the Supreme Court refused to consider moti-
vation in O'Brien. See note 84 supra.
109 FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c) states that courts should grant summary judgment when no
genuine issue of material fact exists and when the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.
110 See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
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ment,'1 ' the plaintiffs would almost certainly have the opportunity
to litigate the issue. On the other hand, Mt. Healthy would not sub-
ject defendants to the costs of groundless suits because Mt. Healthy
requires plaintiffs to raise an issue of illegitimate motivation to get
to trial. 112
IV. Conclusion
The court in G. &A. Books noted that the government was hos-
tile towards the plaintiffs' protected speech. Nevertheless, the court
applied the O'Brien test, summarily dismissing the defendants' de-
sire to silence plaintiffs' protected speech. Courts, however, most
often apply the O'Brien test when the government seeks to regulate
the noncommunicative aspects of a plaintiff's activity and, by doing
so, only incidentally affects his protected speech. It is not, then, a
proper test for G. &A. Books where mixed motives, both legitimate
and illegitimate, were involved in the government's decision.
When a plaintiff establishes that mixed motives entered in the
government's decision, it is necessary to go beyond O'Brien. The
Mt. Healthy test, which requires the government to prove that it
would have reached the same conclusion absent the illicit motives,
would provide a more appropriate balance than the O'Brien test. It
would protect the citizen from deliberate infringement on his pro-
tected speech, and it would also protect the government from hav-
ing to fully litigate groundless claims.
Patrick S. Davies
Charles R. Shreffler, Jr.
Nancy H. Wilder
Addendum
On February 25, 1986, the United States Supreme Court decided City
of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 925 (1986). See
notes 96-98 supra and accompanying text. In Renton, the Court upheld the
constitutionality of a city ordinance that prohibits adult movie theatres from
locating within 1,000 feet of certain property uses. Since the Court found that
the ordinance was predominately aimed at the secondary effects of adult
uses, and not at the content of adult films themselves, the Court (6-1-2) held
that the ordinance was designed to serve the substantial government interest in
preserving the quality of urban life, while allowing for alternative avenues of
communication. Thus, the Court found the ordinance constitutional under the
first amendment. Justice Rehnquist, the author of the majority opinion, re-
111 This would only happen when the plaintiffs failed to make out an issue of illegitimate
motivation in their complaint.
112 See notes 100-03 supra and accompanying text.
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jected the Ninth Circuit's view that if a motivating factor in enacting the
ordinance was to restrict the exercise offirst amendment rights, the ordinance is
invalid, no matter how small a part this motivating factor may have played in
the legislative decision to enact the ordinance. The Court, however, did not
address the relevance of the Mt. Healthy case.
In dissent, Justice Brennan, who was joined by Justice Marshall, stated
that the legislative history strongly suggested that the ordinance was designed
to suppress expression, and thus was not content neutral. Since the city did not
show that the ordinance was a precisely drawn means of serving a compelling
government interest, Justice Brennan argued that the ordinance unconstitu-
tionally infringed upon first amendment rights.
The arguments presented in this case comment for probing into a city's
motives, and for applying the Mt. Healthy analysis to protect first amend-
ment interests in the land use context, apply equally against the Supreme
Court's decision in Renton. Such arguments should be considered by courts
when facing a question similar to that presented in G. & A. Books.
